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THE CONSENSUS MYTH
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM
Benjamin Levin *
It has become popular to identify a “consensus” on criminal justice reform,
but how deep is that consensus, actually? This Article argues that the purported consensus is much more limited than it initially appears. Despite
shared reformist vocabulary, the consensus rests on distinct critiques that
identify different flaws and justify distinct policy solutions. The underlying
disagreements transcend traditional left/right political divides and speak to
deeper disputes about the state and the role of criminal law in society.
The Article maps two prevailing, but fundamentally distinct, critiques of
criminal law: (1) the quantitative approach (what I call the “over” frame);
and (2) the qualitative approach (what I call the “mass” frame). The “over”
frame grows from a belief that criminal law has an important and legitimate
function, but that the law’s operations have exceeded that function. This critique assumes that there are optimal rates of incarceration and criminalization, but the current criminal system is suboptimal in that it has criminalized
too much and incarcerated too many. In contrast, the “mass” frame focuses
on criminal law as a sociocultural phenomenon. This reformist frame indicates that the issue is not a mere miscalculation; rather, reforms should address how the system marginalizes populations and exacerbates both power
imbalances and distributional inequities.

* Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. For helpful comments,
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Paul Butler, Jack Chin, Beth Colgan, Andrew Crespo, Seth Davis, Justin Desautels-Stein, Sharon Dolovich, Don Dripps, Jessica Eaglin, Dan Epps, Jeff Fagan, Dan Farbman, Thomas
Frampton, Trevor Gardner, John Goldberg, Aya Gruber, Eve Hanan, Bernard Harcourt, Carissa Byrne Hessick, Sharon Jacobs, Irene Joe, Liz Kamali, Craig Konnoth, Sarah Krakoff, Alex
Kreit, Corinna Lain, Maximo Langer, Adriaan Lanni, Leah Litman, Tracey Meares, Chris Muller, Erin Murphy, Shakeer Rahman, Carolyn Ramsey, Dan Richman, Alice Ristroph, Pierre
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and members of the Colorado Law Faculty Workshop, the 2018 Criminal Justice Roundtable at
Harvard Law School, the Southwest Criminal Law Workshop, the Climenko Fellows Workshop, the Becoming a Law Professor Reading Group at Harvard Law School, and the 2017
Rocky Mountain Junior Scholars’ Forum. I am deeply indebted to my students at Harvard Law
School and the University of Colorado Law School. The commitment to justice and abiding
skepticism they brought to discussions of criminal law helped inspire this Article. Colin Reeves
provided exceptional research assistance.
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To show how these frames differ, this Article applies the “over” and the
“mass” critique, in turn, to the maligned phenomena of mass incarceration
and overcriminalization. The existing literature on mass incarceration and
overcriminalization displays an elision between these two frames. Some
scholars and reformers have adopted one frame exclusively, while others use
the two interchangeably. No matter how much scholars and critics bemoan
the troubles of mass incarceration and overcriminalization, it is hard to believe that they can achieve meaningful reform if they are talking about fundamentally different problems.
While many scholars may adopt an “over” frame in an effort to attract a
broader range of support or appeal to politicians, “over” policy proposals do
not necessarily reach deeper “mass” concerns. Ultimately, this Article argues
that a pragmatic turn to the “over” frame may have significant costs in legitimating deeper structural flaws and failing to address distributional issues of
race, class, and power at the heart of the “mass” critique.
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Introduction
We live in an era of mass incarceration. Since the early 1970s, the criminal justice system has expanded rapidly, disproportionately affecting poor
people of color. 1 A growing chorus of criminal law scholars, judges, policymakers, and activists increasingly agree that “too many Americans go to too

1. See generally Devah Pager, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an
Era of Mass Incarceration (2007); William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American
Criminal Justice (2011); Bruce Western, Punishment and Inequality in America
(2006); Rachel Barkow, The Criminal Regulatory State, in The New Criminal Justice
Thinking 33 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017).
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many prisons for far too long.” 2 We also live in an era of overcriminalization. During this same time period, state and federal criminal codes have expanded rapidly to the point where no one knows how many criminal laws
actually are on the books. 3 Most adults have—knowingly or unknowingly—
committed a jailable offense. 4
But what are “mass incarceration” and “overcriminalization”? They undoubtedly are significant concepts in both policy and academic circles, not to
mention in the popular imagination. Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim
Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, 5 the critically acclaimed documentary 13th, 6 and a growing body of legal scholarship have
popularized “mass incarceration” as a description of the current structure
and operation of the criminal system.7 Similarly, overcriminalization as a
concept has gained traction. Congress has convened a task force on overcriminalization, 8 and the Heritage Foundation, the Association of Criminal
Defense Attorneys, and other groups have produced extensive reports diagnosing overcriminalization as one of the primary pathologies afflicting the

2. Attorney General Eric Holder, Address at the American Bar Association Annual
Meeting (Aug. 12, 2013), quoted in Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. Seeks to Curtail Stiff Drug Sentences, N.Y. Times (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/12/us/justice-deptseeks-to-curtail-stiff-drug-sentences.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). See generally
United States v. Young, 766 F.3d 621, 630–34 (6th Cir. 2014) (Stranch, J., concurring); United
States v. Valdovinos, 760 F.3d 322, 330–41 (4th Cir. 2014) (Davis, J., dissenting); Nat’l Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring
Causes and Consequences (2014); Barack Obama, Commentary, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 811 (2017); Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent
People Plead Guilty, N.Y. Rev. Books (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/
11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/9PVM-KSD8].
3. See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law (2008); Andrew Ashworth, Conceptions of Overcriminalization, 5 Ohio St. J. Crim.
L. 407 (2008).
4. See generally Harvey A. Silverglate, Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds
Target the Innocent (2009).
5. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the
Age of Colorblindness (2010).
6. 13th (Kandoo Films 2016).
7. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 UMKC L. Rev. 545, 549 (2017)
(“Today, mass incarceration rolls comfortably off the tongues of people of all ideological
stripes.”); James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow,
87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 21 (2012) [hereinafter Forman, Racial Critiques]; Ian F. Haney López, PostRacial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 Calif. L.
Rev. 1023 (2010); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1271 (2004); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal
Republic: Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of Mass Incarceration, 9 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 133
(2011).
8. See Defining the Problem and Scope of Over-Criminalization and OverFederalization: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2013 of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013).
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U.S. criminal system. 9 Legal scholars have organized numerous overcriminalization conferences, 10 and the phrase appears in law review articles written by academics of differing political and methodological commitments. 11
Yet, despite their prevalence in scholarly and policy discussions, these
two phenomena are ill-defined. In different debates they appear to have very
different meanings. And it is not uncommon for a single article to contain a
great deal of slippage in its treatment of what constitutes overcriminalization
or mass incarceration. While there are a plethora of definitions and approaches, two stand out: (1) a quantitative approach focused on calibration
(i.e., there may be an optimal rate of incarceration or criminalization, but the
current rate is too high); and (2) a more qualitative or sociological approach
(i.e., the phenomena reflect a flawed method of managing populations via
criminal law, resulting in significant social costs reflected across axes of class,
gender, sexuality, and race). This definitional inconsistency is not simply a
matter of theoretical or semantic imprecision. As descriptive terms (i.e.,
“mass incarceration” and “overcriminalization”) that carry significant normative weight, their definitions matter. Uncertainty as to the nature of the
phenomena poses significant real-world problems—fixing either of these
problems requires an accurate understanding of the problem itself, and definitional differences yield vastly different policy solutions.
This Article seeks to address the inconsistency by mapping the two
prevalent critiques or critical tendencies: (1) the quantitative approach (what
I will call the “over” frame); and (2) the qualitative approach (what I will call
the “mass” frame). The over frame takes many forms but—at its core—is
rooted in a belief that the criminal law has an important and legitimate function, but that it has exceeded that function. There is an optimal rate of incarceration and an optimal rate of criminalization, but the current criminal sys-

9. Heritage Explains: Overcriminalization, Heritage Found., https://www.
heritage.org/crime-and-justice/heritage-explains/overcriminalization [https://perma.cc/L6DBTXMT]; Overcriminalization, Nat’l Ass’n Crim. Def. Law., http://www.nacdl.org/overcrim
[https://perma.cc/B22H-GLD5]; Overcriminalization, Right on Crime, http://rightoncrime
.com/category/priorityissues/overcriminalization/ [https://perma.cc/K8SX-NY5W]; Overcriminalization, Tex. Pub. Pol’y Found., http://old.texaspolicy.com/issues/overcriminalization
[https://perma.cc/RE5A-4LMB]; Task Force on Overcriminalization, Am. B. Ass’n, https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/initiatives/overcriminalization.html [https://perma.cc/
54MP-D7AZ].
10. Inst. for Humane Studies & The Tex. Pub. Policy Found., The Shared Burden
of Overcriminalization (2017), http://theihs.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/IHS_Booklet
_TPPF_Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XQ5-82BL].
11. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Essay, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals
and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 747 (2005); Jennifer M. Chacón,
Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 613 (2012); Erik Luna, The
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 703 (2005); Glenn Harlan Reynolds,
Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is a Crime, 113 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 102 (2013), https://columbialawreview.org/content/ham-sandwich-nation-due-processwhen-everything-is-a-crime/ [https://perma.cc/VZW9-TXEG].
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tem is sub- (or, perhaps extra-) optimal in that it has criminalized too much
and incarcerated too many. The mass frame, on the other hand, focuses on
the criminal system as a sociocultural phenomenon. 12 The issue is not a miscalibration; 13 rather, it is that criminal law is doing ill by marginalizing
populations and exacerbating troubling power dynamics and distributional
inequities. 14 Every incarcerated person might have been guilty of the charged
offense, and the critique would still hold.
The existing literature on mass incarceration and overcriminalization
displays a troubling elision between these two frames. Some scholars and reformers have adopted one frame exclusively, while others use the two interchangeably. While it has become popular to identify the current moment as
one of “bipartisan consensus” on criminal justice reform, 15 it is important to
recognize how tenuous this consensus is and how much it relies upon different frames and different goals. 16 No matter how much scholars bemoan the
troubles of mass incarceration and overcriminalization, it is hard to believe
that meaningful reform can occur if they are talking about fundamentally
different problems.
To be clear, my claim is not that these two frames or approaches are
wholly distinct or incompatible. Indeed, the over approach might (and does)
add specificity and substance to the mass approach—data puts meat on the
bones of what might otherwise be a gestural skeleton. 17 Likewise, the mass
approach might add theoretical backing to the over approach, helping to il-

12. See Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, in The New Criminal Justice
Thinking, supra note 1, at 71 (“[S]ocio-legal theories of power, social control, race, and institutional structure better explain the criminal process and predict its outcomes.”).
13. See generally Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 Geo. L.J. 1419 (2016).
14. See Stephanos Bibas, Improve, Dynamite, or Dissolve the Criminal Regulatory State?,
in The New Criminal Justice Thinking, supra note 1, at 61, 64–65 (describing this view).
15. See, e.g., Jessica M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, 53 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 595, 636
n.298 (2016); Carl Takei, From Mass Incarceration to Mass Control, and Back Again: How Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform May Lead to a For-Profit Nightmare, 20 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc.
Change 125, 126–27 (2017); Attorney General Eric Holder, Remarks at the National Press
Club (Feb. 17, 2015), in 27 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 297, 299 (2015) (“[I]n the preliminary data we’ve
seen—and the growing, bipartisan consensus surrounding the work that’s underway—they
prove unequivocally that criminal justice reform is an idea whose time has finally come.”); Alex
Altman, Criminal Justice Reform Is Becoming Washington’s Bipartisan Cause, Time (Feb. 19,
2015), http://time.com/3714876/criminal-justice-reform-is-becoming-washingtons-bipartisancause/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
16. See generally Marie Gottschalk, Caught: The Prison State and the
Lockdown of American Politics (2015) (critiquing the consensus narrative and offering a
skeptical treatment of conservative reform movements).
17. See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, Values and Assumptions in Criminal Adjudication, 129
Harv. L. Rev. F. 379, 387 (2016); Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 733, 735 (2000).
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lustrate the effects of an error in calculation. 18 And many scholars, articles,
and books may reflect sympathy or affinity for different tendencies when
faced with different issues or different audiences.
But just because the two approaches might be complementary does not
mean that they are consistent or congruent. Thinking in over terms means
constructing policy solutions designed to reach optimal rates. In turn, reaching optimal rates requires a consensus on what an optimal rate is. Thinking
in mass terms, on the other hand, invites a more radical or totalizing critique
of the current system and its institutions. If criminal law inherently functions to marginalize or subjugate poor people of color, it is not clear that imprisoning fewer black men or increasing enforcement in affluent white
neighborhoods, for example, would remedy deeper structural inequalities in
society. Instead, the mass frame invites a deeper reckoning with questions of
political economy to address the levers of power and the distribution of resources in society. Over solutions might help mass problems, but they need
not. 19 And, importantly, the two critiques operate on different planes and
invite solutions of vastly different magnitudes.
In setting up the typology, this Article proceeds in four Parts. First, Part
I introduces the mass and over frames, situating them (and the typology itself) within the growing critical literature on the criminal system. Next, Part
II describes scholarly critiques of the criminal system rooted in the language
of mass incarceration. This Part presents a brief genealogy of the phrase
“mass incarceration” before teasing out the critiques that fall into the mass
and over frames. Part III employs a similar approach to overcriminalization.
This Part addresses economistic language and approach, while also noting
the ways in which moral philosophers and some theories-of-punishment
scholars have adopted a similar discourse on optimal rates of punishment.
The literature on overcriminalization (unsurprisingly) generally adopts the
over frame, but I argue that some of the overcriminalization literature can
(or should) be read as focusing not on overcriminalization, but on masscriminalization. In Part IV, I argue that the over frame has gained ground, particularly in discussions of mass incarceration. This Part examines the ways in
which this mis-framing has led to a flawed “standard story” 20 of what is
wrong with the criminal system. Further, this Part contends that the over
frame conceals hard and deeply politicized questions about the role of the
state and the proper function of criminal law. The over frame intuitively may

18. Cf. Deborah Jones Merritt, Correspondence, Constitutional Fact and Theory: A Response to Chief Judge Posner, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1287, 1287 (1999) (“[E]mpirical knowledge is
most useful in unmasking the theoretical assumptions that undergird constitutional law . . . .”).
Further mass critiques still rest on an empirical claim about the size and scope of the problem.
See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
19. But, as this Article discusses, over solutions are not always responsive to mass concerns, and may even exacerbate mass problems. See generally infra Section IV.A.
20. See John F. Pfaff, Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration—
and How to Achieve Real Reform (2017).
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have a pragmatic appeal, but ultimately, I argue that the turn to an over
frame is not costless—it legitimates deep structural flaws in the criminal system and misses the opportunity to consider larger reform projects. 21
I.

Mapping Criminal Justice Critiques

The conventional account of criminal law scholarship is that it operates
as a sort of echo chamber: there is a consensus that the criminal system is
(with a few notable exceptions) 22 too harsh and should be reformed. 23 Scholars focused on larger institutional questions tend to decry the current regime
as ineffective, racially disparate, and “broken.” 24 This Article challenges that
conventional account. Many scholars undoubtedly begin from this critical
posture, 25 but that baseline agreement belies deeper disagreements with real

21. On the concept of “legitimation” in criminal law, see generally Paul D. Butler, Essay,
Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 Yale L.J. 2176, 2189 (2013), and Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355, 429–32 (1995).
22. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev.
505, 507 (2001) (noting the “important exception of sexual assault”). Notably, these exceptions
tend to be areas in which progressive or left-leaning scholars favor criminalization that they
frame as exceptional—notably, sexual assault, domestic violence, hate crimes, and environmental and financial crimes. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L.J. 1087 (1986); Mary
Kreiner Ramirez, Prioritizing Justice: Combating Corporate Crime from Task Force to Top Priority, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 971, 972 (2010) (criticizing “[i]nadequate law enforcement against
corporate criminals”); Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 Hastings L.J. 411 (2012); Deborah Tuerkheimer,
Underenforcement as Unequal Protection, 57 B.C. L. Rev. 1287, 1289 (2016). In the context of
each of these crimes, support tends to rest on arguments that the victims are particularly powerless or marginalized by the legal system and/or that criminal law is necessary to help advance
desirable social ends. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 19 (1997);
Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 741, 825 (2007); Tania Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, 18 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 75, 78 (2009).
23. Throughout the Article, I refer to the structures of criminal law’s enforcement and
administration as a “system.” I do so mindful of the compelling critiques of systems theory in
this context. See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, Rethinking the Boundaries of “Criminal Justice,” 15
Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 619 (2018) (reviewing The New Criminal Justice Thinking, supra note
1); Sara Mayeux, The Idea of the “Criminal Justice System,” Am. J. Crim. L. (forthcoming
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3050263 [https://perma.cc/M7
WR-BEUW] (same); Bernard E. Harcourt, The Influence of Systems Analysis on Criminal Law
and Procedure: A Critique of a Style of Judicial Decision-Making (Columbia Pub. Law Research
Paper No. 14-562, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3062900
[https://perma.cc/ZP4W-LH72] (tracing the use of “criminal justice system” as a concept in
legal and social thought). However, given that most of the literature and activism that I analyze
adopts that formulation and offers a “systemic” critique, I continue to use the terms “criminal
system” or “criminal justice system.”
24. See generally Stuntz, supra note 1.
25. There certainly are scholars and commentators active in criminal justice debates
who do not share these baseline critiques, or who do so only very narrowly. See, e.g., William
G. Otis, The Case Against the Smarter Sentencing Act, 26 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 302 (2014); William
Otis, Sentencing Reform: Let’s Keep What We Know Works and Avoid What We Know Fails, 28
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consequences for criminal justice reform. 26 Further, to the extent that other
scholars and commentators have questioned the “bipartisan consensus,” they
have done so along predictable left/right grounds. 27 That is, this skeptical literature tends to conclude that mapping disagreement boils down to differences between political left and right. 28 But that account is not quite right.
The mass and over critiques that this Article describes do not accord neatly
with U.S. political parties or conventional packages of views. 29 Instead, they
reflect deeper beliefs about the role of the state and the proper function of
the criminal system that reject easy political categorization.
To tease out these points of disagreement, this Article examines two
phenomena that have received widespread scholarly and political criticism:
mass incarceration and overcriminalization. Both “mass incarceration” and
“overcriminalization” have become common buzzwords in criminal law
scholarship and in criminal justice policy circles, 30 but neither phrase appears to have a fixed meaning. 31 Instead, each phrase has a fluid definition,

Fed. Sent’g Rep. 219 (2016); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Essay, In Defense of American Criminal
Justice, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1099 (2014).
26. See Nicola Lacey, Humanizing the Criminal Justice Machine: Re-Animated Justice or
Frankenstein’s Monster?, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1299, 1299 (2013) (reviewing Stephanos Bibas,
The Machinery of Criminal Justice (2012)) (“[T]hat the system is in urgent need of reform
marks the limit of scholarly consensus. As soon as one moves to specifics—to analysis of the
particular ways in which the system is defective or problematic; to interpretation of why these
defects or problems have arisen; and perhaps above all, to elaboration of possible solutions and
institutional reforms—one encounters not only the sort of variety that is to be expected in any
vibrant field of scholarship, but also fundamental differences of diagnosis and prescription.”).
27. But see Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life,
129 Harv. L. Rev. 1485, 1551 (2016) (arguing that differences among utilitarians, retributivists, and others complicate the consensus).
28. See, e.g., Gottschalk, supra note 16, at xv.
29. That said, as I discuss later, the mass frame tends to reflect some sort of left critique
of social and economic inequality (broadly conceived). See infra notes 58–59. It is conceivable
to me that there could be some right-leaning version of the mass critique (i.e., identifying a
different set of deep structural issues in U.S. political economy and criminal justice policy), but
I have been unable to identify such a critique in the literature. As discussed later, the over critique transcends traditional political distinction and is as much the province of the rightsfocused libertarian and the technocratic, progressive consequentialist.
30. See, e.g., Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of
Mass Incarceration in America (2006); James Forman, Jr., Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 993 (2010) (reviewing Paul Butler, Let’s Get Free: A Hip-Hop
Theory of Justice (2009)); López, supra note 7, at 1028 n.21; Taslitz, supra note 7, at 133
(“That the last several decades have seen an explosion of Americans’ reliance on imprisonment
as a penal sanction is unquestioned. So vast has this expansion been that the term ‘mass incarceration’ has entered scholarly vocabulary as a way of describing this phenomenon.”) (footnote
omitted).
31. See, e.g., Pfaff, supra note 20, at 8 (“Although widely used, [mass incarceration] has
no precise definition . . . .”); Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm, 68
Vand. L. Rev. 1191, 1197 (2015) (“For a phenomenon that has received so much sustained
attention by legal scholars, identifying an accepted definition of overcriminalization is surpris-
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reflecting different critiques, concerns, and normative commitments in different contexts. This Part introduces what I take to be the two dominant approaches to these pathologies of the criminal system: over and mass. These
approaches, frames, or tendencies reflect two different ways of conceptualizing what is wrong with the criminal system and how to address reform projects. To be clear, there are many ways to criticize the system, and the two
frames I introduce here are not exhaustive and do not capture every critique.
Further, scholars and commentators who generally apply one frame may
sometimes apply another frame or may use different approaches for different
audiences or different desired results. 32
Nevertheless, the typology offered here maps the two major ideological
frames through which scholars discuss the criminal justice system. The typology is an attempt to understand an otherwise fluid literature and to fix
the commitments and approaches that currently dominate the field. To the
extent that “criminal justice reform” has become a catchall category for a
range of critiques, proposals, scholarship, and activism, 33 it is critical that we
understand what exactly needs to be reformed and to what end. 34
Movements to alter sentencing policy, to address police violence, and to
rewrite substantive criminal codes find support in declarations about scholarly and bipartisan consensus. 35 But how broad and real is that consensus? 36

ingly difficult.”); Mona Lynch, Mass Incarceration, Legal Change, and Locale: Understanding
and Remediating American Penal Overindulgence, 10 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 673, 673 n.2
(2011) (“The concept of ‘mass incarceration,’ or ‘mass imprisonment,’ is not fully defined in
the literature . . . .”); Kimberly Thomas, Interpersonal Power in the Criminal System, 50 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 247, 268 n.120 (2013); Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64
Hastings L.J. 423, 427 (2013) (tracking scholarly debate regarding the meaning and use of
“mass incarceration”).
32. See generally infra Part IV. And, as noted above, every criminal law scholar is not
necessarily critical of the system. See supra note 25.
33. See generally Katherine Beckett et al., The End of an Era? Understanding the Contradictions of Criminal Justice Reform, 664 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 238 (2016).
34. Cf. Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff, Introduction: Mapping the New Criminal Justice Thinking, in The New Criminal Justice Thinking, supra note 1, at 1 (making a
similar argument regarding the definition of the criminal system’s scope); Harcourt, supra note
23, at 5–7 (same); Mayeux, supra note 23, at 5–7 (same).
35. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1491,
1497–98 (2008); I. Bennett Capers, The Under-Policed, 51 Wake Forest L. Rev. 589, 590
(2016); Erin R. Collins, Status Courts, 105 Geo. L.J. 1481, 1516 (2017); Andrew Manuel Crespo, Regaining Perspective: Constitutional Criminal Adjudication in the U.S. Supreme Court,
100 Minn. L. Rev. 1985, 1997 (2016); Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The
Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 581, 648 (2012); Kleinfeld, supra note 27, at 1550–51; Perry L. Moriearty, Implementing Proportionality, 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 961, 991 (2017) (describing “a broad-based consensus that criminal justice reform is needed”); Obama, supra note
2, at 822; Michelle S. Phelps, Possibilities and Contestation in Twenty-First-Century US Criminal Justice Downsizing, 12 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 153, 154 (2016); Norman L. Reimer, Will
a Summer of Unease Halt the Momentum for Criminal Justice Reform?, Champion, Sept–Oct.
2016, at 10, Westlaw, 40-Oct Champion 9; Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Shadow Sentencing:
The Imposition of Federal Supervised Release, 18 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 180, 228 (2013); Stuntz,
supra note 22, at 507; Wilkinson, supra note 25, at 1099–1100; Rachael Bade, Criminal Justice
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Viewed from thirty thousand feet, one critique of criminal justice policy
looks very similar to the next. And overstating nuance and difference might
have an effect of stymieing change or discouraging cooperation among reformers and scholars with varying politics, methods, and commitments. But
glossing over real differences and ignoring nuance ultimately undercuts cooperation and effective reform as well. 37 Without a clear diagnosis of the disease, how can anyone propose a cure? And, without appreciating differences
in normative commitments and goals, how can we tell if a proposed reform
is making the problem worse or moving the system in the right direction?
In response to these questions, this Article maps the critical literature on
the criminal system in terms of over and mass. 38 The following chart pro-

Reform Gains Bipartisan Momentum, Politico (July 15, 2015, 5:15 AM), http://www.politico
.com/story/2015/07/criminal-justice-reform-gains-bipartisan-momentum-120125
[https://
perma.cc/6AMV-7GLN]; Radley Balko, Opinion, Here’s What Presidential Candidates’ Websites Say About Criminal Justice Reform, Wash. Post: The Watch (Aug. 6, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/08/06/heres-what-presidentialcandidates-websites-say-about-criminal-justice-reform/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (“Criminal justice reform is the one issue that just about everyone seems to agree on
right now.”).
36. See, e.g., Gottschalk, supra note 16; David Jaros, Flawed Coalitions and the Politics
of Crime, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 1473, 1507 (2014); Scott-Hayward, supra note 35, at 228; Douglas A.
Berman, Is It Really True that “Conservatives and Liberals Are Increasingly United” on Criminal
Justice Reform?, Sent’g L. & Pol’y (Aug. 17, 2012, 10:07 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencing_law_and_policy/2012/08/is-it-really-true-that-conservatives-and-liberals-areincreasingly-united-on-criminal-justice-reform.html [https://perma.cc/9N5E-QLME].
37. See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Beyond the Carceral State, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 651, 664
(2017) (reviewing Gottschalk, supra note 16); Takei, supra note 15, at 127 (“The left and the
right, however, each come to this alliance with distinct and, ultimately, incompatible interests.
Recently, the progressive advocacy community has begun to seriously grapple with the limits
of the left-right alliance. This includes differences over whether and how to address policing
practices and racial disparities in prosecutions, suspicions that conservatives are using decarceration as a Trojan Horse to protect white-collar criminals, and disagreement about whether
decarceration should be accompanied by increased societal investment in housing, employment opportunities, health care, and other social services.”).
38. To be clear, for some readers, over and mass as terms may carry the baggage of their
association with other literatures. Nevertheless, in the analysis that follows, I use both terms
advisedly to describe broader trends in or approaches to criminal justice critique.
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vides a rough description of the key properties that I associate with each
frame:

To put a finer point on it and to understand how the frames play out,
the following chart provides a rough overview of this typology as it applies to
several salient issues in criminal justice scholarship and criminal law reform:

I will return to this chart later when I examine the potential policy proposals that respond to each frame. And I will address questions of incarceration and criminalization at much greater length and in much greater detail
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in Parts II and III. But, for the time being, the chart is meant to illustrate that
these frames may identify closely related problems but identify the core evil
or the desired intervention in very different terms.
The over frame treats criminal justice problems as a matter of degree
that can be remedied by recalibrating the way that the system sorts among
defendants, categorizes conduct, and punishes wrongdoing. 39 The core problem to be addressed is one of scope. This line of critique emphasizes scope
over structure. Former Attorney General Eric Holder’s claim that “too many
Americans go to too many prisons for far too long”40 provides perhaps the
most pithy encapsulation of the critique. 41 Similarly, the mantra of conservative criminal justice reform activists—that the state should be “right on
crime,” not “tough on crime”—speaks to a preference for “right sizing” the
criminal system. 42 The state has criminalized more conduct than traditional
justifications for punishment warrant, so the problem might be remedied by
criminalizing less conduct. 43 An ideal legislature would adopt the proper
theory of punishment and abolish all criminal statutes that do not serve that
theory or justification. For example, if society were to adopt the harm principle, then the legislature would be correct to criminalize conduct that
caused harm, regardless of the harm to the defendant caused by punishment. 44 Similarly, the state incarcerates for too long because the desired ben-

39. See Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 537, 539 (2012) (describing and critiquing this “quantitative” view of overcriminalization).
40. Holder, supra note 2; see also Shon Hopwood, Clarity in Criminal Law, 54 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 695, 702 (2017) (describing “Congress’s penchant for passing too many criminal
laws carrying sentences that are too long”).
41. See also Todd R. Clear, The Effects of High Imprisonment Rates on Communities, 37
Crime & Just. 97, 125 (2008) (“The problem of mass incarceration is entirely produced by the
simple mathematics of two pressure points—how many people enter prison and how long they
stay there.”).
42. See, e.g., McLeod, supra note 37, at 668; Ellen S. Podgor, Introduction: Overcriminalization; New Approaches to a Growing Problem, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 529, 534
(2012); Vikrant P. Reddy & Marc A. Levin, Right on Crime: A Return to First Principles for
American Conservatives, 18 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 231 (2014); Statement of Principles, Right on
Crime,
http://www.rightoncrime.com/the-conservative-case-for-reform/statement-ofprinciples/ [https://perma.cc/ZX8Y-FP4E].
43. See, e.g., Husak, supra note 3, at 3–4; Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 157 (1967); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Regulation,
Prohibition, and Overcriminalization: The Proper and Improper Uses of the Criminal Law, 42
Hofstra L. Rev. 745, 745 (2014); Luna, supra note 11, at 712–13.
44. Cf. Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Drugs, Dignity, and Danger: Human Dignity as a
Constitutional Constraint to Limit Overcriminalization, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 291, 294–95 (2013)
(advocating for decriminalization of “victimless” crimes). As Bernard Harcourt has shown,
however, applying such a principle is easier said than done. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 109, 194 (1999); see also Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
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efits of incarceration could be obtained more quickly or without such an extreme degree of punishment. 45 Therefore, the state should recalibrate punishment to achieve the desired effect while reducing inefficient or unjustified
incarceration. 46
Perhaps the easiest way to appreciate and understand the over frame is
to consider its poster child: the “nonviolent”47 drug offender. 48 Viewed
through this frame, the individual serving an extended prison sentence for a
drug offense represents the apotheosis of the criminal system’s ills. She is being punished for conduct that is not necessarily morally blameworthy and
does not necessarily have a victim (contra “violent” crime). 49 Her conduct
has been overcriminalized (because it could be regulated effectively nonjudgment); Eugene Volokh, Essay, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 Va. L.
Rev. 1957, 1969 (2004).
45. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring
Federal Sentencing After Booker, 2005 U. Chi. Legal F. 149, 164; John Conyers, Jr., The Incarceration Explosion, 31 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 377, 378 (2013) (“This mass incarceration is overincarceration. . . . [A] criminal justice system based on mass incarceration, in which we lock up
more and more people, and particularly more people of color, with no crime reduction impact,
and at a tremendous financial cost to our federal and state budgets, accomplishes none of those
goals.” (emphasis omitted)); Chad Flanders, Reply, Can Retributivism Be Progressive?: A Reply
to Professor Gray and Jonathan Huber, 70 Md. L. Rev. 166, 170 (2010); Timothy W. Floyd, Steven’s Choice, 10 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 203, 203 (2012) (“Although prisons are a necessary evil,
we imprison far too many people in our society, and for far too long.”); Jennifer Seltzer Stitt,
Worth Fighting For: Keeping the Promise of Sentencing Reform, 23 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 126, 128
(2010).
46. See Clear, supra note 41, at 125–26 (“If the problem of mass incarceration is the
large number of people who go into prison and how long they stay there, then the solution is
for fewer to go in and for shorter stays. In other words, the solution is not programmatic . . . .”).
47. While such a discussion falls largely outside the scope of this Article, the distinction
between violent and nonviolent crimes (and defendants) remains far from certain. See generally Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law in the Shadow of Violence, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 571, 621 (2011).
Therefore, even though categorizing a certain crime as “violent” and attaching severe punishment and collateral consequences may have some intuitive appeal, it is not clear that courts
and legislators have been successful in drawing these lines. See generally id.; Benjamin Levin,
It’s Time to Rethink “Violent” Crime: How Mislabeling Misconduct Contributes to Our Bloated
Criminal Justice System, Salon (June 19, 2016, 2:30 PM), http://www.salon.com/2016/06/19/
its_time_to_rethink_violent_crime_how_mislabeling_misconduct_contributes_to_our_
bloated_criminal_justice_system/ [https://perma.cc/4CD3-ZL6F]. Indeed, the Supreme Court
continues to grapple with what constitutes a “crime of violence” for purpose of “career offender” statutes. See, e.g., Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017); Welch v. United States, 136
S. Ct. 1257 (2016); Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
48. See James Forman Jr., Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black
America 221–22, 228–31 (2017) [hereinafter Forman, Locking Up Our Own] (critiquing the
“non-violent only” approach to criminal justice reform); Gottschalk, supra note 16, at 165–
69 (criticizing reformers’ focus on those who have committed “nonviolent, nonserious, and
nonsexual” crimes).
49. See, e.g., Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 44, at 294–95; Floyd, supra note 45, at
203; Stuart P. Green, Vice Crimes and Preventive Justice, 9 Crim. L. & Phil. 561, 561–62 (2015);
Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting “Apparent Innocence” in the Criminal Law, 33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 35 (1995).
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criminally) and she has been overincarcerated (because she does not deserve
the punishment). 50
The mass frame, on the other hand, is less concerned with the culpability
of the individual defendant. 51 Instead, this frame is rooted in an inherent
skepticism about the operation and goals of the criminal system as embedded in a larger model of governance. 52 Where the over frame emphasizes
scope, the mass frame prioritizes structure. The mass critique asks why criminal law has replaced other regulatory models and what the consequences of
criminal regulation are (e.g., arrest, conviction, and collateral consequences
of both). 53 In this respect, mass accounts are largely phenomenological. This
line of critique focuses on the ways in which the criminal system marginalizes not only individual defendants, but also communities that bear the brunt
of criminalization. 54 The mass frame would also lead to a critique of the
nonviolent drug offender’s treatment, but it would not rest on the offender’s
lack of culpability. 55 Indeed, this frame also can encompass (or invite) critiques of criminalizing violent conduct. 56 That is, this critical tendency transcends a focus on “nonviolent” offenders or “nonserious” offenses. Generally,
this frame stresses the ways in which the criminal system contributes to, and
50. See Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 Emory L.J. 1533, 1536 (1997).
51. See, e.g., David Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in Mass
Imprisonment: Social Causes and Consequences 1, 2 (David Garland ed., 2001); Traum,
supra note 31, at 427.
52. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 5, at 4 (“I came to see that mass incarceration in the
United States had, in fact, emerged as a stunningly comprehensive and well-disguised system
of racialized social control that functions in a manner strikingly similar to Jim Crow.”); Marsha
Weissman, Aspiring to the Impracticable: Alternatives to Incarceration in the Era of Mass Incarceration, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 235, 237 (2009) (“Mass incarceration is a symptom
of grave structural problems in the United States. . . . The reliance on incarceration for social
control is . . . due to . . . larger socio-economic issues and structural racism that have marginalized a large percentage of the U.S. population.”).
53. See, e.g., Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 643, 716 (2009); Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 809 (2015).
54. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Wechsler’s Century and Ours: Reforming Criminal Law in
a Time of Shifting Rationalities of Government, 7 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 247, 265 (2003) (“Mass
imprisonment abandons the individual as a target of penal power in favor of dangerous classes.
The careful calibration of the social interest in sanctioning certain behaviors is replaced by a
zero tolerance model in which those designated as dangerous are subjected to long-term containment on the model of waste management. Imprisonment remains a plausible if unpredictable strategy to deal with serious crime, but mass imprisonment promotes something different,
the indiscriminate use of imprisonment as a response to even modest levels of criminality
when they are associated with feared or despised groups.”).
55. See, e.g., Forman, Locking Up Our Own, supra note 48, at 221–22.
56. See, e.g., id.; Ristroph, supra note 47, at 621 (“The criminal law is a necessary feature
of any society of vulnerable embodied persons. We must punish violence. Or so it seems, until
we discover that we are not always sure what counts as violence, and the criminal law doesn’t
always punish what seems to be violence, and in fact, the greatest source of violence might be
the criminal law itself.” (emphasis omitted)).
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is a part of, greater structural inequalities in society. 57 In this respect, the
mass frame is less a critique of the criminal system as such than it is a critique of legal, social, economic, and racial injustice that uses the criminal system as an example or a point of entry. 58
Ultimately, then, the mass frame is more (or at least more explicitly) an
ideological critique. In contrast, the over frame is more ideologically indeterminate—the fiscal conservative, the libertarian, and the liberal/progressive
egalitarian all might adopt it. The project of recalibrating or “right sizing”
might (and does) bring together groups whose normative commitments and
vision of the optimal rate of criminalization or incarceration vary. In contrast, the mass frame—at least in its strong form—is rooted in a particular
(left) ideological critique of neoliberalism, capitalism, and structures of governance. Of course, there are different flavors of “left,” and mass critiques
and critics have different political valences and endorse different policy solutions. Some critics adopting a mass frame might embrace what Allegra
McLeod describes as a “prison abolitionist ethic,” 59 while others might hold
less radical views and be more open to prisons, police, and prosecutors who
served different sociopolitical ends or who were directly responsible to marginalized communities. Regardless, these critiques seem to retain a certain
affinity (broadly defined) and a certain commitment to a more radical
reimagining of the state and the criminal system. 60
This Part has offered only a rough sketch of two complicated, nuanced
visions of the criminal system’s flaws. In doing this, I am not suggesting that
either frame is monolithic. At times, in this Part and in this Article, the
strong form of either frame may appear unfamiliar or extreme, but—to be

57. See Alexander, supra note 5, at 185 (describing mass incarceration as a “set of
structural arrangements that locks a racially distinct group into a subordinate political, social,
and economic position”); López, supra note 7, at 1028.
58. See, e.g., Emily Hughes, Investigating Gideon’s Legacy in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
122 Yale L.J. 2376, 2386 (2013) (conceptualizing “mass incarceration as a social justice or civil
rights issue and not simply a criminal justice issue”).
59. Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 1156,
1156 (2015); see also Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 405 (2018); Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law As an Abolitionist Project,
111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1597, 1604–05 (2017) (“My criminal law scholarship has not claimed that
criminalizing pregnant black women, loitering laws, order-maintenance policing, mass incarceration, capital punishment, and police terror enforce a democratic system in a discriminatory manner. Rather, I have argued that these institutions enforce an undemocratic racial caste
system originating in slavery. Making criminal law democratic, then, requires something far
more radical than reducing bias or increasing inclusion in this anti-democratic system. Democratizing criminal law requires dismantling its anti-democratic aspects altogether and reconstituting the criminal justice system without them. I therefore have joined calls for an abolitionist approach.”).
60. Because of its phenomenological orientation, the mass frame encompasses not only
normative critiques of prison and the carceral state, but also descriptive and theoretical work in
a range of disciplines from history to political science and criminology. See generally Levin,
supra note 23 (describing the shifting and overlapping terms of interdisciplinary “criminal justice” scholarship).
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clear—I am not suggesting that each author or article cited would endorse
that strong form. Nor am I suggesting that a given author or article adopts
only one approach. Instead, my hope is to use this strong form of the typology to map the prevailing critiques of the criminal system and to emphasize
the ways in which very different legal, political, and institutional reforms
might flow from different frames. In the next two Parts, I explain the two
frames using as examples the lively scholarly debates about mass incarceration and overcriminalization.
II.

Incarceration

While the first law journal article to use the term “mass incarceration”
appeared in 1938, 61 the use of the phrase to denote a distinct phenomenon
did not gain significant traction for over half a century. In the intervening
decades, the phrase appeared occasionally in passing, mostly in reference to
the imprisonment of Japanese Americans during World War II. 62 Notably,
“mass incarceration” in these articles appears to reflect the state’s focus on
using incarceration to target a discrete racial or ethnic group. 63 The phrase/
concept crops up—with a similar connotation—in the early 1980s. 64 But its
use appears to take off in the 1990s, 65 led by the work of David Garland. 66

61. See Joseph N. Ulman, A National Program to Develop Probation and Parole, 29 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 517, 524–25 (1938) (“[I]f a prison term is imposed the young criminal goes to a reformatory or a prison in which the mass incarceration of hundreds or even
thousands of inmates makes almost impossible any effective work of rehabilitation.”).
62. See, e.g., Roger Daniels, American Historians and East Asian Immigrants, 43 Pac.
Hist. Rev. 449, 465 n.47 (1974); Walter F. Murphy, Civil Liberties and the Japanese American
Cases: A Study in the Uses of Stare Decisis, 11 W. Pol. Q. 3, 6, 12 (1958); Philip Tajitsu Nash,
Moving for Redress, 94 Yale L.J. 743, 744, 753 (1985) (reviewing John Tateishi, And Justice
for All: An Oral History of the Japanese American Detention Camps (1984)); William
L. Richter, “The Revolver Rules the Day!”: Colonel DeWitt C. Brown and the Freedmen’s Bureau
in Paris, Texas, 1867–1868, 93 Sw. Hist. Q. 303 (1990).
63. See, e.g., Roger Daniels, The Japanese American Cases, 1942–2004: A Social History,
68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 159, 163–64 (2005); Nash, supra note 62, at 753.
64. See, e.g., Francis Cullen & John Wozniak, Fighting the Appeal of Repression, 18
Crime & Soc. Just. 23, 23 (1982) (“It is not too much to assert that Americans have long felt
comfortable with the notion that the best solution to the crime problem is to put criminals in
jail. While our role in founding the modern penitentiary is often overstated, it is nevertheless
true that we were the first people to embrace the practice of mass incarceration and to proselytize others to the merits of this crime control strategy.”); Richard L. Rubenstein, Moral Outrage
as False Consciousness, 9 Theory & Soc’y 745, 746 (1980) (arguing that “institutions of mass
incarceration and enslavement” helped define twentieth century politics); Peter H. Schuck, The
Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 41 (1984) (“[M]ass asylum claims
have encouraged the INS to adopt an explicit policy of mass incarceration of undocumented
aliens . . . .”).
65. See, e.g., David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American
Criminal Justice System (1999); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of)
Order in the Inner City, 32 Law & Soc’y Rev. 805, 813 (1998); Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil
Amar and the (Premature?) Demise of Criminal Procedure Liberalism, 107 Yale L.J. 2281, 2323
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Twenty years, later, “mass incarceration” has become a commonplace
phrase (or concept) 67 used by academics, 68 judges, 69 and politicians alike. 70
The following chart constructed from Google Ngram data reflects the spike
in use of “mass incarceration” and “mass imprisonment” during the 1990s
and 2000s. 71

(1998) (reviewing Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First
Principles (1997)).
66. See David Garland, The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in
Contemporary Society, 36 Brit. J. Criminology 445, 461 (1996) (“In a society which manifests deep social and racial divisions, which experiences high crime rates and levels of insecurity, where welfare solutions have been politically discredited, and in which a developing commercial sector encourages and facilitates the expansion of imprisonment—in other words in
societies such as the USA or the UK—a punitive political and legal culture soon gives rise to
mass incarceration, with all of its social and financial consequences.”).
67. As this Part—and this Article, generally—suggests, it is not clear that the phrase always has a clear theoretical content. Or, to the extent that it does, it is not clear that “mass incarceration” is a single concept or phenomenon, rather than a catchall for a range of critiques
or pathologies.
68. See, e.g., Vincent Chiao, Mass Incarceration and the Theory of Punishment, 11 Crim.
L. & Phil. 431 (2017); David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 Ohio St. J.
Crim. L. 27 (2011); Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the Deinstitutionalization of Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, 9 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 53 (2011); Mona
Lynch, Mass Incarceration, Legal Change, and Locale, 10 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 673
(2011); Alexander Shalom, Bail Reform as a Mass Incarceration Reduction Technique, 66 Rutgers L. Rev. 921 (2014); Jonathan Simon, Consuming Obsessions: Housing, Homicide, and
Mass Incarceration Since 1950, 2010 U. Chi. Legal F. 165; Michael Tonry, Remodeling American Sentencing: A Ten-Step Blueprint for Moving Past Mass Incarceration, 13 Criminology &
Pub. Pol’y 503 (2014).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Anglin, 846 F.3d 954, 967 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Citing Professor
Alexander’s seminal work on mass incarceration, the judge assured Anglin that he ‘does not
approach sentencing blindly or without due regard for the consequences of substantial incarceration, particularly in a case like this with a young man age 25.’ ”); United States v. Valdovinos, 760 F.3d 322, 339 (4th Cir. 2014) (Davis, J., dissenting); United States v. Black, 750 F.3d
1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2014) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“In this era of mass incarceration, in
which we already lock up more of our population than any other nation on Earth, it is especially curious that the government feels compelled to invent fake crimes and imprison people for
long periods of time . . . .”); United States v. Young, 960 F. Supp. 2d 881, 903 (N.D. Iowa 2013)
(describing “our Nation’s mass incarceration problems”); United States v. Bannister, 786 F.
Supp. 2d 617, 649–51 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); United States v. Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 2d 200, 202–03
(D. Mass. 2008).
70. See, e.g., Conyers, supra note 45; Obama, supra note 2; Juleyka Lantigua-Williams,
Cory Booker Takes Justice Reform Personally, Atlantic (May 22, 2016), https://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/what-cory-booker-criminal-reform/483794/
[https://
perma.cc/83KW-AEXX]; Leahy: Congress Must Address the Nation’s Exploding Prison Population This Year, Patrick Leahy (July 22, 2015), https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahycongress-must-address-the-nations-exploding-prison-population-this-year [https://perma.cc/
HQA2-GUSD].
71. Google Ngram of “Mass Incarceration,” “Mass Imprisonment,” “Over Incarceration,” and “Over Imprisonment,” Google Books Ngram Viewer, http://bit.ly/2t2qSXJ
[https://perma.cc/8VKE-NTRJ].
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Of course, this chart hardly paints a complete picture. 72 The data only runs
through 2008, so it fails to capture the Obama years and the spike in criminal
justice reform literature following the release of The New Jim Crow. 73 And,
critically, it includes books, rather than law review articles. But it does help
illustrate just how important the “mass incarceration” critique is. But what is
that critique? 74 This Part argues that there is both an over and a mass iteration of the mass incarceration critique, and that these two critiques have very
different focal points, suggesting very different possible solutions.
A. Mass Incarceration
As noted above, the early uses of the phrase to characterize Japanese incarceration appear to reflect a mass frame—the focus is the social function of
imprisonment, more so than the sheer number of Japanese Americans who
suffered. But Garland—in what might be the clearest and most cited definition of the phenomenon 75—offers a precise statement of the mass frame:
What are the defining features of mass imprisonment? There are, I think,
two that are essential. One is sheer numbers. Mass imprisonment implies a
rate of imprisonment and a size of prison population that is markedly

72. While the Google Ngram viewer remains a helpful way of tracking usage across
time, its limitations are well-documented. See, e.g., Eitan Adam Pechenick et al., Characterizing
the Google Books Corpus: Strong Limits to Inferences of Socio-Cultural and Linguistic Evolution,
10 PLoS ONE: e0137041 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0137041 [https://
perma.cc/6UY4-GDKG]; Sarah Zhang, The Pitfalls of Using Google Ngram to Study Language,
Wired (Oct. 12, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/pitfalls-of-studyinglanguage-with-google-ngram/ [https://perma.cc/869E-9VNJ].
73. A Westlaw search indicates that The New Jim Crow has been cited by 973 law review
articles since its publication. (Search conducted on August 23, 2018 using search term: “The
New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness”).
74. Cf. Robert Weisberg, Reality-Challenged Philosophies of Punishment, 95 Marq. L.
Rev. 1203, 1203–04 (2012) (“Over the past decade, the humanities and social sciences have
yielded substantial literature examining the rise of mass incarceration from various perspectives, ranging from econometric analyses of contributory factors to cultural critiques of American exceptionalism in penal policy.”).
75. See Forman, Racial Critiques, supra note 7, at 23 n.6. (“David Garland is credited
with coining ‘mass imprisonment . . . .’ ” (quoting Garland, supra note 51, at 1–2)).
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above the historical and comparative norm for societies of this type. The
US prison system clearly meets these criteria. The other feature is the social
concentration of imprisonment’s effects. Imprisonment becomes mass imprisonment when it ceases to be the incarceration of individual offenders
and becomes the systematic imprisonment of whole groups of the population. In the case of the USA, the group concerned is, of course, young black
males in large urban centres. For these sections of the population, imprisonment has become normalized. It has come to be a regular, predictable
part of experience, rather than a rare and infrequent event. 76

This two-part definition first provides a quantitative statement that—taken
alone—might serve as the basis for the over frame. But, critically, Garland
pairs that concern (i.e., too many people in prison) with a deeper critique of
incarceration’s social function.
From a mass perspective, perhaps the most important word in Garland’s
definition in “systemic.” That is, the critique is not about one-off interactions between individuals and the legal system; rather, the phenomenon is a
phenomenon because of its structural or systemic dimensions. 77 The quantitative critique or element is a means of understanding the larger structural
point—that the criminal system is a form of social control that creates and
exacerbates societal inequalities. It is this element of Garland’s definition
that helps explain the mass definition and how it differs from a purely quantitative account of mass incarceration.
Critiques applying a mass frame (and even those critical and agnostic
about it) tend to characterize mass incarceration much like Garland does. 78
Such critiques have stressed that punishment and marginalization operate
collectively, rather than simply on an individual basis. 79 Jonathan Simon has
described mass incarceration as a set of structures that imposes “systemic inhumanity and racialized violence.” 80 Similarly, in The New Jim Crow,
76. Garland, supra note 51, at 5–6. While Garland uses the phrase “mass imprisonment,” “[t]he terms ‘mass incarceration’ and ‘mass imprisonment’ are used synonymously in
the criminal justice literature.” Forman, Racial Critiques, supra note 7, at 23 n.6.
77. See also Simon, supra note 54, at 256–58. But see United States v. Tarango, No. CR
07–2443, 2015 WL 10401775, at *22 (D.N.M. Oct. 29, 2015) (“While many criticize the federal
courts for ‘mass incarceration,’ surely this phrase is a hyperbole, or at least a poor shorthand
for the problem being addressed; there is no ‘mass incarceration’—each defendant was separately convicted and sentenced, one at a time.”).
78. See Nicole P. Dyszlewski et al., Mass Incarceration: An Annotated Bibliography, 21
Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 471, 476–77 (2016) (“Among mass incarceration scholars, David Garland is the father of mass incarceration.”).
79. See, e.g., Traum, supra note 31, at 427 (identifying mass incarceration as “a group
and systemic problem, not merely an individual problem”); Bruce Western & Christopher
Muller, Mass Incarceration, Macrosociology, and the Poor, 647 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc.
Sci. 166, 168 (2013) (“[I]ncarceration must be so extensive and concentrated that it imprisons
not just the individual but the group.”).
80. Jonathan Simon, Amnesty Now! Ending Prison Overcrowding Through a Categorical
Use of the Pardon Power, 70 U. Miami L. Rev. 444, 475 (2016); see also Jonathan Simon, The
Return of the Medical Model: Disease and the Meaning of Imprisonment from John Howard to
Brown v. Plata, 48 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 217, 220 (2013).
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Michelle Alexander argues that mass incarceration has operated as a “stunningly comprehensive and well-disguised system of racialized social control.” 81
Much as Garland’s definition is essential to understanding the mass critique, so too is The New Jim Crow (and the critical response to it). The New
Jim Crow delivers a searing critique of the criminal system as a model of
marginalizing and subjugating people of color, particularly black men. 82 And
the book helped herald a growing public awareness of the criminal system’s
flaws. 83 As James Forman, Jr. puts it, Alexander’s book “played a crucial role
in providing advocates with a framework for understanding, and a rhetoric
for criticizing, the War on Drugs. Published in 2010, the book quickly became required reading for anyone concerned about mass incarceration.” 84
Forman recounts how the D.C. City Council’s 2014 decision to decriminalize
marijuana possession rested—at least in part—on the resonance of the book:
“various witnesses [at hearings] cit[ed] The New Jim Crow and one city
council member explain[ed] that the book had ‘compelled me to be heavily
engaged in this conversation.’ ” 85
In this respect, The New Jim Crow operates as one of the most recognizable critiques of mass incarceration. But that doesn’t mean that its approach or arguments have been embraced by other academic critics of mass
incarceration. Scholars have leveled a number of criticisms at The New Jim
Crow 86: the book overstates the role of the War on Drugs and understates the
role of violent crime; 87 the book overemphasizes the federal system when, in
81. Alexander, supra note 5, at 4; see also Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control,
59 UCLA L. Rev. 1418, 1446 (2012) (“[T]he current crisis that we call mass incarceration or
punishment comprises multiple intersections—not just of identity and power but of systemic
dynamics that themselves do the work of subordination.”).
82. See generally Alexander, supra note 5.
83. See, e.g., Gottschalk, supra note 16, at 3 (“[T]he contributions of Alexander’s The
New Jim Crow cannot be underestimated. No other book has been so vital in making the problem of the carceral state starkly visible to the wider public and in rallying members of disadvantaged communities and other groups to take on the project of dismantling it.”); Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Perspectives on Police, Policing, and Mass Incarceration, 104
Geo. L.J. 1531, 1534–37 (2016) (describing the book as “a modern classic” and observing that
“The New Jim Crow makes a notable contribution to public discourse, shedding light on how
society became trapped in the current web of overzealous punishment and then pointing the
way out”).
84. Forman, Locking Up Our Own, supra note 48, at 220.
85. Id. (quoting Public Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary and Public Safety on
the Simple Possession of Small Quantities of Marijuana Decriminalization Amendment Act of
2013, D.C. Council 3, 50 (Oct. 24, 2013) (statement of David Grosso, Council Member)).
86. This list is not meant to be exhaustive. See generally Jonathan Wood, Note, The Old
Boss the Same as the New Boss?: Critiques and Plaudits of Michelle Alexander’s New Jim Crow
Metaphor, 7 Geo. J.L. & Mod. Critical Race Persp. 175 (2015) (collecting critiques).
87. See, e.g., Gottschalk, supra note 16, at 126–30; Pfaff, supra note 20, at 5–6, 21;
Forman, Racial Critiques, supra note 7, at 23; Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 Fordham
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fact, states incarcerate vastly more individuals than the federal government; 88
the book paints race in the United States as black and white, understating the
criminal system’s impact on Latinos and other racial and ethnic groups; 89 the
book focuses on the role of white conservatives and understates the role of
liberals and black lawyers, lawmakers, and activists in constructing the apparatus of mass incarceration; 90 and the book stretches the historical analogy to
Jim Crow. 91 These critiques certainly have some merit and add important
and much-needed nuance to the discussion of the criminal system’s flaws.
But some of the critiques of The New Jim Crow appear to be rooted less in
any problem with Alexander’s arguments than in a difference of frame or
perhaps even a fundamental disagreement as to what mass incarceration is.
Granted, some scholars’ criticisms operate as internal critiques—mass
concerns that Alexander might have overstated, understated, or missed. But
from an over perspective, the critique is essentially empirical; for example,
the laws that Alexander blames (primarily drug crimes) actually account for
a comparatively small portion of all prosecutions, arrests, and convictions. 92
Instead, jails and prisons are filled disproportionately with people who have
committed violent crimes. 93
This critique serves as the backbone for John Pfaff’s well-received book
Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration—And How to Achieve Real
Reform. 94 To Pfaff, The New Jim Crow has helped popularize a flawed
“standard story” of mass incarceration. 95 The standard story is misleading,
according to Pfaff, as it presents the War on Drugs as the true enemy and
convinces reformers and scholars that rethinking drug prohibition would
reverse or end mass incarceration. 96
This critique of the drug-centric narrative is right as far as it goes. To the
extent that The New Jim Crow’s contribution is the argument that drug arrests and prosecutions directly caused the spike in U.S. prison populations,

L. Rev. 2173, 2194 (2016); Anders Walker, The New Jim Crow? Recovering the Progressive Origins of Mass Incarceration, 41 Hastings Const. L.Q. 845, 846 (2014).
88. See generally Pfaff, supra note 20; German Lopez, Why You Can’t Blame Mass Incarceration on the War on Drugs, Vox (May 30, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policyand-politics/2017/5/30/15591700/mass-incarceration-john-pfaff-locked-in [https://perma.cc/
C4NV-8GP3].
89. See, e.g., Forman, Racial Critiques, supra note 7, at 60.
90. See, e.g., Forman, Locking Up Our Own, supra note 48; Michael Javen Fortner, Black Silent Majority: The Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Politics of
Punishment (2015); Naomi Murakawa, The First Civil Right: How Liberals Built
Prison America (2014); Forman, Racial Critiques, supra note 7, at 23.
91. See, e.g., Forman, Racial Critiques, supra note 7, at 23; Walker, supra note 87, at
848–55.
92. See, e.g., Pfaff, supra note 20, at 5–6, 21.
93. See id.
94. See generally id. at 21–51.
95. See id. at 5.
96. See generally id. at 21–51.
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then Pfaff (and others) are spot on and have done an important service by
offering such a corrective. 97 Reading The New Jim Crow through an over
frame renders some of its core claims contestable at best and dramatically
reduces its effect. But, despite its importance, Pfaff’s critique assumes only
one mode of critique—an over mode. Mass critiques of the book identify
other issues but recognize that Alexander’s critique is about more than arrest
numbers; it also operates as a mass account of the criminal system. 98
In other words, we might read the book as more of a sociological or cultural claim—the War on Drugs (as a component of the broader War on
Crime) served to marginalize generations of people of color, particularly
young black men. This marginalization occurs via formal legal structures—
collateral consequences in the labor market, in housing, and in voting
rights 99—and also via social and legal estrangement. 100 So, the impact of the
War on Drugs transcends any data that we could track using the Bureau of
Justice Statistics. Insofar as the criminal system serves a function of social
control, of public education, and of constructing social meaning, 101 the War
on Drugs and aggressive policing of poor people of color sends a critical
message—a message of second-class citizenship and othering. 102 Borrowing
Garland’s formulation, “[P]enal exclusion has been layered on top of economic and racial exclusion, . . . ensuring that social divisions are deep-

97.

I will return to Pfaff’s account (and definition) of mass incarceration infra in Section

II.B.
98. In a sense, The New Jim Crow demonstrates how mass and over approaches can coexist in the same work. The book rests on both an empirical claim and a cultural claim. See Alexander, supra note 5, at 16–19.
99. See id. at 143, 158, 187, 193. Cf. Pager, supra note 1, at 28–41; Western, supra note
1, at 6 (describing the process of “social exclusion”).
100. Cf. Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126
Yale L.J. 2054, 2083 (2017) (describing the social construction of “legal estrangement”).
101. See, e.g., Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society 102 (W.D. Halls
trans., 1984) (1893); Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison 138 (Alan Sheridan trans., 2d ed. 1995); Benjamin Levin, Inmates for Rent, Sovereignty for
Sale: The Global Prison Market, 23 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 509, 554 n.90 (2014); cf. Raymond
Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School 59
(1981) (“To say that the members of the society take a basic social institution to be ‘legitimate’
is to say that they take it to ‘follow’ from a system of norms they all accept[,] . . . a set of general
beliefs (normative beliefs and other kinds of beliefs) which are organized into a world-picture
which they assume all members of the society hold. So a social institution is considered legitimate if it can be shown to stand in the right relation to the basic world-picture of the group.”);
Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, 15 Legal Stud. F. 327, 347 (1991)
(“[T]he legal system creates as well as reflects consensus (this is true both of legislation and of
adjudication). Its institutional mechanism ‘legitimates,’ in the sense of exercising normative
force on the citizenry.”).
102. See Bell, supra note 100, at 2083.
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ened . . . and that a criminalized underclass is brought into existence and systematically perpetuated.” 103
Viewed through the mass frame, then, mass incarceration comprises a
system of making and enforcing criminal law, as much as it consists of individual case outcomes or numbers of people incarcerated. 104 Paul Butler describes “[m]ass incarceration’s process of control” as “the social and legal
apparatus by which poor people [and black people] become losers in criminal justice.” 105 Butler identifies “five steps” that make up the process of exclusion:
(1) The spaces that poor people, especially poor African Americans, live in
receive more law enforcement in the form of police stops and arrests.
(2) The criminal law deliberately ignores the social conditions that breed
some forms of law-breaking. Deprivations associated with poverty are
usually not “defenses” to criminal liability, although they may be factors
considered in sentencing.
(3) African Americans, who are disproportionately poor, are the target of
explicit and implicit bias by key actors in the criminal justice system, including police, prosecutors, and judges.
(4) Once any person is arrested, she becomes part of a crime control system
of criminal justice, in which guilt is presumed. Prosecutors, using the legal apparatus of expansive criminal liability, recidivist statutes, and
mandatory minimums, coerce guilty pleas by threatening defendants
with vastly disproportionate punishment if they go to trial.
(5) Repeat the cycle. A criminal caste is created. Two-thirds of freed prisoners are rearrested, and half return to prison, within three years of their
release. 106

Butler’s account does not foreground guilt or innocence. Rather, his description is a structural critique of how institutions operate to strip power and
agency from the already-marginalized. The system fails not because it mistakes the innocent for the guilty, but because it creates a “criminal caste.” 107
As Butler’s critique illustrates, the mass frame suggests that mass incarceration is not just about incarceration as such. Instead, it is a critique of a
mode or method of doing criminal law—of lawmaking, of enforcement, and
of regulating court-involved individuals. Mass incarceration encompasses
modes of policing, interactions between civilians and criminal justice officials, and a host of causes, effects, and features of the carceral state. For ex-

103. Garland, supra note 51, at 2; see also Jonathan Simon & Richard Sparks, Punishment
and Society: The Emergence of an Academic Field, in The Sage Handbook of Punishment
and Society 1, 11 (Jonathan Simon & Richard Sparks eds., 2013).
104. See generally Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, and the Limits of Law 11 (2d ed. 2015).
105. Butler, supra note 21, at 2183.
106. Id. at 2183–85 (footnotes omitted).
107. See id.
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ample, Jack Chin has argued that the term “mass incarceration” “obscures
the reality” of the criminal system. 108 According to Chin, “mass conviction”
would make a more appropriate label—it is not incarceration that does
much of the harm to court-involved individuals; instead, conviction (even if
unaccompanied by incarceration) triggers a vast web of collateral consequences and a social status akin to “civil death.” 109 Indeed, mass conviction
still would be underinclusive or would fail to capture the breadth of the
criminal system. Arrest or simply contact with police officers can be enough
to catapult an individual into the Kafkaesque realm of collateral consequence, fines, and fees. 110 That realm, that web of laws, of social structures,
and of formal and informal consequences comprises the target of critique. 111
Taking the broadest or strongest form of the critique, then, leads us to a
deeper critique of the state and broader structures of governance. 112 Marie
Gottschalk describes the U.S. structures of governmentality as “the carceral
state.” 113 Likewise, Bernard Harcourt describes the post-1970 approach to

108. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1789, 1804 (2012).
109. Id. at 1803–06; see also Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 611, 612 n.2, 693 (2014) (“The era of mass incarceration might
more accurately be called the era of mass conviction and correctional supervision, as parole
and probation populations have grown at an even faster rate than the incarcerated population.”).
110. See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 83, at 1537; Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 307, 314 (2016); Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing:
Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 Minn. L. Rev. 2397, 2431
(2017); Jain, supra note 53; Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 Vand. L.
Rev. 1055, 1079–81 (2015) [hereinafter Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization]; Alexandra
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 11 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 255, 258 (2015).
111. See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead & Katie Rose Guest Pryal, Symposium 2014: Vulnerable
Defendants in the Criminal Justice System; Introduction, 93 N.C. L. Rev. 1211, 1221 (2015)
(“Whether it is solitary confinement, the prosecution of minors for prostitution, racial profiling, criminalizing the mentally ill, or sexually abusing children in custody, the common denominator is that these practices are all by-products of the systemic problems that continue to
plague our criminal justice system.”); Dorothy E. Roberts, Privatization and Punishment in the
New Age of Reprogenetics, 54 Emory L.J. 1343, 1350–51 (2005) (“Mounting social science
studies on the community-level impact of mass incarceration reveal that prison has become a
systemic aspect of community members’ family affairs, economic prospects, political engagement, social norms, and childhood expectations for the future.”).
112. See Akbar, supra note 59, at 110 (describing radical interventions as “expand[ing]
the frame for police violence beyond criminal process, to the interlocking systems that propel
and draw from anti-Black racism”).
113. See generally Gottschalk, supra note 16; Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the Carceral State: The Future of Penal Policy Reform, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 1693, 1693 (2006) (“Three features distinguish the U.S. carceral state: the sheer size of its prison and jail population; its reliance on harsh, degrading sanctions; and the persistence and centrality of the death penalty.”);
cf. Michael Meranze, Pathology of the Carceral State, L.A. Rev. Books (Feb. 4, 2015) (reviewing Gottschalk, supra note 16), https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/pathology-
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criminal justice policy as “neoliberal penality”—the state has adopted a “deregulatory” or free market approach to the economy but has grown significantly as an institution of punishment. 114 In this vein, a range of mass critiques emphasize the ways in which a deterioration of the New Deal or Great
Society welfare state has led to a new vision of governance in which the government replaces provision of benefits with provision of punishment and
where the model of addressing poverty and social problems is via the criminal system. 115 Sharon Dolovich and Alexandra Natapoff argue that “[e]ven as
our welfare institutions route the disadvantaged into the criminal system, the
criminal process itself functions as a powerful engine of social inequality.” 116
Likewise, Aya Gruber contends that “[t]he tough-on-crime philosophy that
overtook America was not a singular phenomenon, divorced from a larger
political and economic program, but a distinct part of a neoliberal paradigm
of rampant individualism, minimization of government services, and unconstrained capitalism.”117 That is, mass incarceration reflects a political system
in which the state is “governing through crime.” 118
carceral-state/ [https://perma.cc/55RF-693T] (tying Gottschalk’s characterization and critique
of the carceral state to Michel Foucault’s conception of the “carceral archipelago”).
114. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment
and the Myth of Natural Order 40–44 (2011) (“Neoliberal penality facilitates passing
new criminal statutes and wielding the penal sanction more liberally because that is where government is necessary, that is where the state can legitimately act, that is the proper and competent sphere of politics. By creating and reinforcing this categorical division between a space of
free self-regulation and an arena where coercion is necessary, appropriate, and effective, neoliberal penality has fertilized the growth of the penal domain.”); Bernard E. Harcourt, On the
American Paradox of Laissez Faire and Mass Incarceration, 125 Harv. L. Rev. F. 54 (2012);
see also Aziza Ahmed, Adjudicating Risk: AIDS, Crime, and Culpability, 2016 Wis. L. Rev.
627, 629–30, 630 n.13; Allegra M. McLeod, Regulating Sexual Harm: Strangers, Intimates, and
Social Institutional Reform, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 1553, 1581 (2014); Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 Md. L. Rev. 682, 765 (2013)
(“As Bernard Harcourt and Loïc Wacquant have shown, neoliberal penality has been a hallmark of U.S. politics since the 1970s.”).
115. See, e.g., Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis,
and Opposition in Globalizing California 85–86 (2007); Nicola Lacey, The Prisoners’ Dilemma: Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary Democracies 170–73 (2008); Loïc Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity 1–3 (2009); Angelina Snodgrass Godoy, Converging on the
Poles: Contemporary Punishment and Democracy in Hemispheric Perspective, 30 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 515, 517 (2005); Aya Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy, 85 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 129, 171 (2014); Aya Gruber, A Provocative Defense, 103 Calif. L. Rev. 273, 331 (2015);
Gustafson, supra note 53, at 646 n.12 (“A number of sociologists use the term criminalization
of poverty to describe an element of neoliberalism that involves the mass incarceration of poor
people of color.”); McLeod, supra note 37, at 667; Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New
Penology, 20 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 417, 438 (2009).
116. Dolovich & Natapoff, supra note 34, at 14.
117. Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 Wash. L. Rev. 581, 618–19
(2009) (footnote omitted).
118. See Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime
Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear 17 (2007) (“When
we govern through crime, we make crime and the forms of knowledge historically associated
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B. Over Incarceration
The over frame shares many similar concerns with the mass frame and
relies on much of the same data, but the underlying definition of the phenomenon differs, and the breadth of the critique is significantly narrower. In
the introduction to Locked In, Pfaff observes the challenge in defining mass
incarceration. 119 Pfaff cites to Garland’s definition in an endnote, observing
that “the second part [of the definition] may do some real work.” 120 Nevertheless, Pfaff concludes that “[t]he criticisms over ‘mass incarceration’ essentially boil down to claims that we have too many people in prison . . . and
that we should reduce that number . . . .” 121 Race is a part of Pfaff’s critique
(and his reading of others’ critiques), 122 but generally not in the totalizing
caste sense that the mass frame indicates. 123 Instead, viewed through an over
lens, the issue is whether too many people of color are incarcerated, as compared to either an optimal rate or the rate at which white people are incarcerated. 124
Pfaff’s book serves as an instructive point of entry into the over frame for
mass incarceration both because: (1) it provides a compelling version of the
account; and (2) it expresses skepticism about the over incarceration frame
and suggested policy solutions. 125 To the first point, Pfaff’s account of mass
incarceration, its causes, and its cures rests almost exclusively on quantitative

with it—criminal law, popular crime narrative, and criminology—available outside their limited original subject domains as powerful tools with which to interpret and frame all forms of
social action as a problem for governance.”).
119. See Pfaff, supra note 20, at 8.
120. Id. at 241 n.13. Pfaff continues that “the first part [i.e., the quantitative portion of the
definition] provides little guidance about when ‘high’ becomes ‘mass.’ ” Id. (citing David Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, 3 Punishment & Soc. 5 (2001)).
121. Id. at 8.
122. See, e.g., id. at 44–50, 146–47.
123. But see id. at 49 (“It is also essential to address the structural barriers that limit access to the primary job market in the first place—to focus on making sure people have first
chances before trying to help them get second ones. Yet this is not something that the criminal
justice system is equipped to do, which points to very real limits on what reforms that focus on
the criminal justice system by itself can accomplish.” (footnotes omitted)).
124. See id. at 44–49.
125. Pfaff has articulated similar critiques and arguments elsewhere. See, e.g., John F.
Pfaff, Federal Sentencing in the States: Some Thoughts on Federal Grants and State Imprisonment, 66 Hastings L.J. 1567 (2015); John F. Pfaff, The Empirics of Prison Growth: A Critical
Review and Path Forward, 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 547 (2008); John F. Pfaff, The War on
Drugs and Prison Growth: Limited Importance, Limited Legislative Options, 52 Harv. J. on
Legis. 173 (2015); John F. Pfaff, The Complicated Economics of Prison Reform, 114 Mich. L.
Rev. 951 (2016) (reviewing Hadar Aviram, Cheap on Crime: Recession-Era Politics and
the Transformation of American Punishment (2015), and Gottschalk, supra note 16);
John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by a Metaphor: A Deeply Problematic Account of Prison Growth, 111
Mich. L. Rev. 1087 (2013) (reviewing Ernest Drucker, A Plague of Prisons: The Epidemiology of Mass Incarceration in America (2011)).
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analysis. Trained as an economist (as well as a lawyer), Pfaff provides a datadriven story of growing prison populations that rejects the primacy of the
War on Drugs, emphasizes the role of prosecutors, and stresses the importance of states and localities, rather than the federal government. 126 In
this respect, Locked In operates as a direct response to The New Jim Crow—
using the over frame, Pfaff sets out to debunk empirical errors and overstatements that he views as undermining the “standard story” of mass incarceration. 127
While different scholars articulate the over critique differently, as a way
of understanding mass incarceration, it rests on a concern about too much. 128
Taken in its extreme form, we can imagine mass incarceration represented
by an equation 129:
High Rate of Incarceration + 1 = Mass Incarceration
or:
High Prison Population + 1 = Mass Incarceration
The assumption is that there is an optimal (or acceptable) rate of punishment, and at some point, society crosses a line, and we get mass incarceration. Through this frame, “[t]he problem of mass incarceration is entirely
produced by the simple mathematics of two pressure points—how many
people enter prison and how long they stay there.” 130 And, by that logic, “[i]f
the problem of mass incarceration is the large number of people who go into
prison and how long they stay there, then the solution is for fewer to go in
and for shorter stays.” 131
Mass critiques also may rely on prison, arrest, and conviction data (reflecting Garland’s first element). 132 But those accounts remain focused on the

126. See generally Pfaff, supra note 20.
127. See id.
128. See, e.g., Husak, supra note 3, at 4 (identifying the criminal system’s flaws as boiling
down to “too many crimes” and “too much punishment”); Conyers, supra note 45, at 378
(“This mass incarceration is overincarceration.” (emphasis omitted)).
129. Cf. Pfaff, supra note 20, at 241 n.13 (expressing frustration about the lack of clarity
as to when “high” incarceration becomes “mass” incarceration).
130. Clear, supra note 41, at 125; see also John J. Donohue III, Economic Models of Crime
and Punishment, 74 Soc. Res. 379, 384 (2007) (identifying mass incarceration as operating
through “more frequent and longer impositions of terms of imprisonment as well as through
the war on drugs”).
131. Clear, supra note 41, at 125–26.
132. See Garland, supra note 51, at 5–6; see also Katherine Beckett & Bruce Western,
Governing Social Marginality: Welfare, Incarceration, and the Transformation of State Policy, in
Mass Imprisonment: Social Causes and Consequences, supra note 51, at 35–50; Bernard
E. Harcourt, An Institutionalization Effect: The Impact of Mental Hospitalization and Imprisonment on Homicide in the United States, 1934–2001, 40 J. Legal Stud. 39, 62 (2011); Roberts, supra note 7, at 1274 (“The first feature of mass incarceration is simply the sheer numbers
of African Americans behind bars.”).
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social control element—the numbers are an illustration of just how extreme
the marginalization is. 133 Over critiques, on the other hand, tend to focus on
the data not only as evidence of the problem, but as the problem itself. 134
While Pfaff largely adopts the over frame, he also articulates compellingly one of the key challenges with such an approach: the lack of a shared understanding of the optimal or acceptable rate of punishment. 135 “Part of the
problem,” he explains:
[I]s that no one has provided a metric for determining how many people in
prison is “too many” (except perhaps prison abolitionists, for whom it is
any number much greater than zero). Should we rely on some sort of strict
cost-benefit analysis—and if so, what sorts of costs and benefits should we
include? Does harm to the inmate count, for example, or harm to the inmate’s family? And are there other moral values, such as retributivism or
mercy, that argue for more or fewer people in prison, independent of any
effect on crime or safety or budgets? 136

For a model that at first appears to offer greater clarity than the mass
frame, 137 this question of optimal rates, metrics, and theories of punishment
quickly complicates matters.
Indeed, surveying over critiques of mass incarceration reveals a range of
metrics, cost-benefit analyses, and theories of punishment driving the designation of “mass.” Some scholars and critics do not necessarily identify their
metric or their theory of socially acceptable incarceration—the current
amount is too much, and it is greater than the amount earlier in U.S. history,
but there is no articulated standard for what the rates should be. 138 On the
other hand, some scholars frame mass incarceration as a failure or problem
because it flies in the face of some other value. For a range of critics, the
problem is one based on cost and efficiency: the state should be punishing,
but the current system costs too much, given the limited returns in terms of
increasing public safety. 139 This critique has been a staple of the advocacy

133. See generally Beckett & Western, supra note 132.
134. See, e.g., Clear, supra note 41, at 125–26; Pfaff, supra note 20, at 8.
135. See Pfaff, supra note 20, at 8.
136. Id.
137. Cf. Western & Muller, supra note 79, at 168 (describing the second part of Garland’s
two-part definition as “more elliptical” than the first part).
138. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Restructuring Clemency: The Cost of Ignoring Clemency and a Plan for Renewal, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (2015); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Essay,
Searching for Solutions to the Indigent Defense Crisis in the Broader Criminal Justice Reform
Agenda, 122 Yale L.J. 2316, 2328 (2013); Michael M. O’Hear, Mass Incarceration in Three
Midwestern States: Origins and Trends, 47 Val. U. L. Rev. 709, 709 (2013); Shalom, supra
note 68, at 923; Taslitz, supra note 7, at 133.
139. See e.g., Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91
Notre Dame L. Rev. 537, 551 (2015); Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88
Wash. L. Rev. 1103 (2013) (“Driven by a number of factors, not the least of which is the
enormous human and financial cost of mass incarceration, policy makers are now shrinking
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from conservative and libertarian criminal justice reformers. 140 But an efficiency-maximizing approach also has gained ground with judges, scholars,
activists, and politicians with other political commitments. 141
Aside from pure economic efficiency, a range of scholars and commentators embrace an over critique relying on a preferred theory of punishment.
If punishment should be designed for optimal deterrence, the critique goes,
the current rate of punishment is excessive. 142 The deterrence could be
achieved by incarcerating fewer individuals for less time. 143 From a retributive standpoint, the critique sounds in the language of moral desert: an individual who commits a crime deserves to be punished, but the current degree
of punishment is too great and is not morally required. 144 Incapacitationist

prison and jail populations and pursuing cheaper non-brick-and-mortar social control options.” (footnotes omitted)); Suzanne Valdez, A Policy Paper on What Can Be Done About
Low-Level, Non-Violent Female Drug Offenders in Kansas, 25 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 131, 133
(2015); Marc Levin, Marc Levin Testimony at House Judiciary Committee Overcriminzalization
Task Force, Right on Crime (May 30, 2014), http://rightoncrime.com/2014/05/marc-levintestimony-at-house-judiciary-committee-overcriminalization-task-force/
[perma.cc/MZ7PPGRD].
140. See, e.g., Reddy & Levin, supra note 42; Michael Tonry, Making American Sentencing
Just, Humane, and Effective, 46 Crime & Just. 441, 449 (2017); Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan,
Opinion, Prison Reform: A Smart Way for States To Save Money and Lives, Wash. Post (Jan.
7, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/06/AR201101060
4386.html [https://perma.cc/D3V9-YJXB].
141. See, e.g., United States v. Leitch, Nos. 11–CR–00609 (JG), 11–CR–00457 (JG), 11–
CR–00039 (JG), 2013 WL 753445, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2013); United States v. Diaz, No.
11–CR–00821–2 (JG), 2013 WL 322243, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013) (“Mass incarceration
comes at great cost; prison is expensive. The annual cost of housing a prisoner is $21,006 for a
minimum-security facility; $25,378 for a low-security facility; $26,247 for a medium-security
facility; and $33,930 for a high-security facility. The President’s Fiscal Year 2013 budget request
for BOP is over $6.9 billion dollars, an increase of $278 million or 4.2% from the Fiscal Year
2012 budget. The BOP budget request accounts for about 25% of DOJ’s overall budget request.
We will spend almost exactly as much on federal prisons alone as we do on the entire federal
judiciary.” (footnotes omitted)); Mirko Bagaric, From Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing:
Reducing the Rate of Imprisonment and Crime While Saving Billions of Taxpayer Dollars, 19
Mich. J. Race & L. 349 (2014); Barkow, supra note 1, at 45; Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. Rev. 189, 212 (2013) (“Bipartisan calls for reform in particular emphasize evidence that rehabilitation is cheaper than incarceration.”); Fan, supra note 35, at 634;
Heather Schoenfeld, The War on Drugs, the Politics of Crime, and Mass Incarceration in the
United States, 15 J. Gender Race & Just. 315, 316 (2012).
142. See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric et al., Bringing Sentencing into the 21st Century: Closing the
Gap Between Practice and Knowledge by Introducing Expertise into Sentencing Law, 45 Hofstra L. Rev. 785, 789 (2017).
143. See Robert Weisberg, Empirical Criminal Law Scholarship and the Shift to Institutions, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 1378 (2013).
144. See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric & Sandeep Gopalan, Saving the United States from Lurching
to Another Sentencing Crisis: Taking Proportionality Seriously and Implementing Fair Fixed
Penalties, 60 St. Louis U. L.J. 169, 190 (2016); Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment,
68 Stan. L. Rev. 933, 1036 (2016); Mark Osler & Mark W. Bennett, A “Holocaust in Slow Motion?” America’s Mass Incarceration and the Role of Discretion, 7 DePaul J. for Soc. Just.
117, 157 (2014) (“[T]here are too many people, especially people of color, in too many prisons,
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critics focused on public safety note that the current system does a bad job
sorting out the truly dangerous defendant from the one who might pose less
of a social threat. 145 As a result (similarly to the efficiency critique), the state
is incarcerating people who do not (or cease to) pose a danger to society. 146
Finally, some over accounts take up the expressive or democratic-legitimacybased concern about “rule of law” and respect for institutions: How can the
criminal system embody community norms and serve a public educational
function when so many people are incarcerated and when the public perceives the system as unjust or punishment as excessive?147 While these critiques might not speak in utilitarian or consequentialist terms (e.g., “optimal
punishment”), they present an account based on a belief that justifiable punishment has overflowed its banks.
Of course, these critiques vary dramatically. And just because a scholar
articulates a preferred theory of punishment or metric does not mean that
Pfaff’s observation lacks merit—how do we know when punishment is too
expensive or what punishment matches the exact degree of a defendant’s
culpability? 148 Nevertheless, these over accounts retain a baseline assumption

serving sentences that are far too long, and that this mass incarceration serves no legitimate
penal or law enforcement rationale.”).
145. See, e.g., Guyora Binder & Ben Notterman, Penal Incapacitation: A Situationist Critique, 54 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2017); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Prosecution, 51
Wake Forest L. Rev. 705, 729 (2016).
146. See United States v. Moore, 851 F.3d 666, 676 (7th Cir. 2017) (Posner, J., dissenting)
(“Many violent offenders, moreover, age out of crime, often as early as their mid- to latetwenties—’by the time a person in his 30s has generated a long criminal history suggesting that
he poses a continuing risk, he is likely to have started “aging out” of crime, violent behavior in
particular. . . . A long prison sentence also undermines someone’s ability to find the stabilizing
influence of a job or a spouse, thus increasing the long-run risk that he will reoffend.’ ” (quoting John Pfaff, A Better Approach to Violent Crime, Wall Street J. (Jan. 27, 2017, 11:58 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-better-approach-to-violent-crime-1485536313 (on file with the
Michigan Law Review)).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Spears, 469 F.3d 1166, 1190 (8th Cir. 2006) (Bye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Perceived improper racial disparity fosters disrespect for
the law and lack of confidence in the criminal justice system . . . .” (quoting U.S. Sentencing
Comm’n, Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 103
(2002))), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 552 U.S. 1090, and opinion vacated in part, reinstated
in part on reh’g, 533 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 2008); Lissa Griffin & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ministers of
Justice and Mass Incarceration, 30 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 301, 321 (2017); Tracey L. Meares,
Place and Crime, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 669, 680–84 (1998).
148. See Pfaff, supra note 20, at 8–13. Indeed, Pfaff’s trenchant critiques of (the empirical aspects of) the “Standard Story” rest on places where critics’ metrics are not clear or appear
to clash with their critiques or proposed police solutions. For example, Pfaff (like a number of
critics who generally adopt a mass frame), emphasizes the failure to address violent crime.
Many accounts of mass incarceration focus only on “nonviolent” crime, despite the majority of
people incarcerated are serving time for “violent” offenses. That is, confronting the question of
violent crime requires a reckoning with who should be incarcerated and for how long. I take
the central thrust of Pfaff’s argument to be that if critics claim that they are focused on num-
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that some degree of punishment is necessary, and the core functions and
structures of the criminal system are legitimate, but that the current regime
misses the mark in advancing legitimate ends. That is, despite their normative differences, each of these accounts focuses on the first prong of Garland’s definition.
But what about the second element of Garland’s definition? Is it fair to
say that over critiques focus exclusively on element one? I think not. 149 Although race plays a different role in these critiques than the mass accounts,
racial disparities remain a major focus of many over critiques. 150 Indeed, race
receives significant attention in many over critiques and is often used as a
way to frame what makes overpunishment so objectionable. 151 Yet, unlike
mass critiques, over characterizations do not purport to reimagine racial hierarchies in society or to provide a broader account of the relationship
among race, law, and, power. Rather, the over critique of mass incarceration’s racial dimensions focuses on a narrower form (or forms) of inequality:
per capita arrest and conviction rates, sentence duration, prosecutorial
charging decisions, etc. That is, the over critique targets specific instances of
racial inequality reflected in the available data on the criminal system as specific instances in need of a fix. 152
For example, take critiques of drug possession enforcement. The over
frame focuses on whether black defendants who used illegal drugs were as
likely to be arrested and serve time as white defendants engaged in the same
conduct. 153 Certainly, the mass critic might share these concerns; but the
over critics’ concerns would (at least ostensibly) be addressed if these rates
were equalized, even if that meant leveling up punishment, such that more
white defendants were arrested and charged. 154 As a practical matter, it
might well be that critics adopting an over critique of racialized drug enforcement would balk if the state actually began enforcing drug laws universally in an effort to equalize disparities. Nevertheless, the critiques themselves sound as though such a policy would be responsive.

bers exclusively (i.e., the movement to cut the prison population in half), then the stories that
they are telling of prisons full of nonviolent, nonrepeat, nonserious offenders are misleading.
149. Certainly, some over accounts may pay little attention to race or may mention race
only in passing.
150. See, e.g., Spears, 469 F.3d at 1190 (Bye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Stuntz, supra note 1; Osler & Bennett, supra note 144, at 157.
151. See, e.g., Barkow & Osler, supra note 138; Conyers, supra note 45, at 378.
152. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 Yale L.J. 2, 30 (2013).
153. See, e.g., Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 179 n.27 (D. Mass. 2004); People v.
Price, 2016 IL App (1st) 141054-U, ¶ 130 (“Much has been written recently about whether the
mass incarceration of black men for minor drug offenses through lengthy sentences is an abuse
of the justice system’s discretion. I believe that it is.” (citation omitted)).
154. See Aya Gruber, Equal Protection Under the Carceral State, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1337,
1366–68 (2018) (discussing the difference between solutions to inequality that “level-up” and
“level-down”).
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In short, comparing the mass critique to the over critique reveals some
shared set of basic concerns. But the scope and nature of the critiques appear
to be quite different. The next Part takes the literature on overcriminalization as a space that reveals a similar divide.
III. Criminalization
By all accounts, “overcriminalization” entered the scholarly lexicon in
the 1960s through the work of Sanford Kadish. 155 Writing in 1967, Kadish
lamented that “American criminal law . . . has extended the criminal sanction well beyond . . . fundamental offenses to include very different kinds of
behavior, kinds which threaten far less serious harms, or else highly intangible ones about which there is no genuine consensus, or even no harms at
all.” 156 Kadish defines the phenomenon as a pressing one in the criminal justice system generally but concludes that it is cause for particular concern in
“situations in which the criminal law is used: (1) to declare or enforce public
standards of private morality, (2) as a means of providing social services in
default of other public agencies, and (3) as a disingenuous means of permitting police to do indirectly what the law forbids them to do directly.” 157
While its definition changed (and the number of crimes on the books
increased), 158 overcriminalization has remained a staple of criminal law liter-

155. See Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
785, 785 (2012) (“As far as I can tell, Sanford Kadish coined the term ‘overcriminalization’ in a
1962 article in the Harvard Law Review . . . .” (citing Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 904, 909 (1962))).
156. Kadish, supra note 43, at 158.
157. Id. at 159.
158. See, e.g., Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law, Am. Bar Ass’n,
The Federalization of Criminal Law 7 (1998); Smith, supra note 39, at 538 (“Federal criminal law has been growing at a breakneck pace for generations. According to a 1998 American
Bar Association report, an incredible 40% of the thousands of federal criminal laws passed
since the Civil War were enacted after 1970. . . . On average, Congress created fifty-seven new
crimes every year between 2000 and 2007, roughly the same rate of criminalization from the
two prior decades, resulting today in some 4,500 federal laws that carry criminal penalties.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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ature in the ensuing decades. 159 Like “mass incarceration,” “overcriminalization” has seen varied usage over time. 160

And, as recurring law review articles illustrate, it remains a topic of continuing interest to legal academics. 161 “Those most closely studying the phenomenon regard it as a vexing problem of the criminal justice system; some say it
is the most pressing problem in criminal law today.” 162 At the same time, the
phenomenon also has captured the imagination of judges, politicians, advocates, and policy organizations. 163 In 2013, the House Judiciary Committee

159. See, e.g., Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 249–364
(1968); David A.J. Richards, Sex, Drugs, Death, and the Law: An Essay on Human
Rights and Overcriminalization (1982); Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 223, 224 (2007); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L.
Rev. 193, 197 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Hush!: The Criminal Status of Confidential Information After McNally and Carpenter and the Enduring Problem of Overcriminalization, 26 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 121 (1988); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 105, 159 (1994); Pilcher, supra
note 49, at 31 (1995).
160. Google Ngram of “overcriminalization,” “Overcriminalization,” “over - criminalization,” “over criminalization,” and “OVERCRIMINALIZATION,” Google Books Ngram
Viewer, http://bit.ly/2vb2Sht [https://perma.cc/MJY4-AV67]. Of course, the same caveats regarding the limitations of Ngram apply here as they did in the context of mass incarceration.
Supra note 72. It is worth noting that, much as the mass incarceration data misses post-New
Jim Crow usage, so too does the ovecriminalization data precede the publication of Douglas
Husak’s widely cited Overcriminalization: The Limits of Criminal Law. See Husak, supra note
3.
161. See, e.g., Zach Dillon, Foreword, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 525 (2012); Ellen S.
Podgor, Foreword, 7 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 565 (2011) (describing the “Overcriminaization 2.0”
symposium); Ellen S. Podgor, Foreword, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 Am. U.
L. Rev. 541, 541 (2005) [hereinafter Podgor, The Politics of Crime]; Symposium, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 541 (2005).
162. Haugh, supra note 31, at 1194.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 766 F.3d 621, 634 (6th Cir. 2014) (Stranch, J., concurring) (“Congress is well aware of the problem of over-criminalization . . . .”); Brian W.
Walsh & Tiffany M. Joslyn, Heritage Found. & Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def.
Law., Without Intent: How Congress Is Eroding the Criminal Intent Requirement in Federal Law (2010).
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unanimously created a taskforce on overcriminalization that met ten times
over the following year. 164
Also, much like mass incarceration, overcriminalization is a phenomenon that has been criticized roundly from a range of political and ideological
perspectives. Notably, for example, the Heritage Foundation and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers have frequently joined forces to
advocate for solutions to the problem of overcriminalization and have encouraged further scholarship on the topic.165 However, as with mass incarceration, this ostensible consensus belies deeper disagreements rooted in different conceptions of the phenomenon and the criminal system itself.
Therefore, as in Part II, this Part teases out those differences by addressing
the phenomenon through both an over and a mass frame.
A. Overcriminalization
Like “mass incarceration,” “overcriminalization” lacks a universally accepted definition. 166 But, unlike the literature on mass incarceration, the literature on overcriminalization is chock full of attempts to define the phenomenon. 167 And, also unlike the mass incarceration literature, most of the

164. See Congressional Task Force on Overcriminalization, Nat’l Ass’n Criminal Def.
Law., https://www.nacdl.org/overcrimtaskforce/ [https://perma.cc/D3UV-MDYN]. The problem of overcriminalization had been a topic of interest to the Committee prior to the Task
Force’s inception. See Reining in Overcriminalization: Assessing the Problem, Proposing Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010); Over-Criminalization of Conduct/Over-Federalization of
Criminal Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009); Paul J. Larkin, Jr, Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 715, 721 (2013).
165. See, e.g., Dillon, supra note 161, at 525 (“Overcriminalization is one of those rare
topics where both the political right and political left come together. The Heritage Foundation
and the American Civil Liberties Union joined forces to cosponsor our live Symposium and
send the unified message that whether you are liberal, moderate, or conservative, overcriminalization is an issue that can no longer be ignored. Yet, despite this bipartisan support, the tendency to overcriminalize continues to grow stronger.”); Podgor, The Politics of Crime, supra
note 161, at 541 (“The Heritage Foundation and the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (NACDL), two groups with very distinct missions, joined together with the American
University Law Review to examine the topic of overcriminalization. Despite standing at different points on the philosophical spectrum, the two groups recognized the grave implications of
a criminal justice system that fails to consider increased federalization, the diminished recognition of a mens rea element in criminal statutes, and a growing prosecution of conduct that
could be addressed via civil sanctions.”).
166. See Hopwood, supra note 40, at 703.
167. See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 11, at 648 n.182; Haugh, supra note 31, at 1194; Dmitriy
Kamensky, American Peanuts v. Ukrainian Cigarettes: Dangers of White-Collar Overcriminalization and Undercriminalization, 35 Miss. C. L. Rev. 148, 151 (2016); Larkin, supra note 43,
at 745; Luna, supra note 11, at 713–17; Geraldine Szott Moohr, Defining Overcriminalization
Through Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Example of Criminal Copyright Laws, 54 Am. U. L. Rev.
783, 806 (2005); Smith, supra note 39, at 539–40; Stephen F. Smith, Essay, Yates v. United
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overcriminalization literature adopts a decidedly over frame. Put simply,
“ ’overcriminalization’ posits that there are too many criminal laws on the
books today,” 168 and overcriminalization is a problem because “we have . . .
too many crimes in the United States.” 169
In this respect, overcriminalization invites (or is embedded in) an over
frame for the criminal system—criminal law and punishment have their
place, but the current system of criminalization has run amok. In defining
the phenomenon, most scholars adopt a critique along the lines of Kadish’s,
but they tend to provide a set of descriptive elements or features, rather than
a formal definition. For example, Sara Sun Beale contends that overcriminalization is characterized by “(1) excessive unchecked discretion in enforcement authorities, (2) inevitable disparity among similarly situated persons,
(3) potential for abuse by enforcement authorities, (4) potential to undermine other significant values and evade significant procedural protections,
and (5) misdirection of scarce resources (opportunity costs).” 170 In explaining how overcriminalization works in practice, Beale emphasizes two particular classes of crimes that exhibit the properties: (1) crimes that regulate
morals; and (2) federal crimes that stretch the boundaries of federalism. 171
Likewise, Erik Luna asserts that “the overcriminalization phenomenon consists of: (1) untenable offenses; (2) superfluous statutes; (3) doctrines that
overextend culpability; (4) crimes without jurisdictional authority; (5) grossly disproportionate punishments; and (6) excessive or pretextual enforcement of petty violations.”172 That is, the over frame indicates that overcriminalization is as much a phenomenon (i.e., the passage of too many criminal
statutes) as it is a means of classifying certain laws (i.e., criminal statutes that
are objectionable, unnecessarily, or illegitimate).
Just as the over critique of mass incarceration begged the question of
baselines or metrics, 173 so too does this way of thinking about overcriminalization. 174 As Stephen Smith observes:
It is, of course, difficult to make such claims without a normative baseline—an idea of what constitutes the “right” number of criminal laws—and
such a baseline is elusive at best. Still, history and crime rates provide relevant benchmarks, and they suggest that the criminal sanction is being seri-

States: A Case Study in Overcriminalization, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 147, 147 (2014) (defining overcriminalization as “the existence of multitudinous, often overlapping criminal laws
that are so poorly defined that they sweep within their ambit conduct far afield from their intended target”).
168. Smith, supra note 39, at 538.
169. Husak, supra note 3, at 4.
170. Beale, supra note 11, at 749.
171. See id.
172. Luna, supra note 11, at 717.
173. See supra notes 135–138 and accompanying text.
174. See Smith, supra note 39, at 538.
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ously overused, particularly at the federal level, where overcriminalization
has resulted in nothing less than the federalization of crime. 175

Much like Pfaff’s over critiques of mass incarceration, Smith’s account rightly notes the problem of metrics, but then assumes that the problem is, in
some sense, obvious: just as there are too many people in prison, there are
too many crimes on the books. 176
As with the mass incarceration literature, however, a survey of the overcriminalization literature indicates that while many commentators agree that
there is a problem, identifying just what constitutes overcriminalization can
be a trickier proposition because the metrics applied vary. Indeed, the wide
political spectrum of voices opposing overcriminalization makes the question of baselines and normative commitments even more difficult to answer.
To the civil libertarian critic, overcriminalization represents a triumph
of the authoritarian state and a vitiation of individual rights. 177 Whether it is
using criminal law to impose a certain vision of morality, or whether it is
empowering police and prosecutors unduly, overcriminalization poses a
danger to individual rights or liberties. 178 Through this lens, those rights and
liberties might be endangered by any criminal laws or law enforcement, but
the presence of constitutional protections and a belief that some conduct
might (or should) be criminalized keeps this from becoming an anarchic or
abolitionist critique. 179 Instead, this critique focuses on a range of criminal
laws that often run counter to left political interests (e.g., criminalization of

175. Id.
176. While I share Pfaff’s belief that there are too many people in prison and Smith’s belief that there are too many criminal laws on the books, I do not think either conclusion is obvious without some normative baseline, metric, or set of commitments. In this case, the appeal
to history does not strike me as terribly convincing. Society and the legal system have changed
dramatically over time. That the criminal code does not resemble criminal codes from the Early Republic need not be a problem. (Unless, of course, one’s normative commitment was that
any departure from eighteenth century social, legal, and political orderings would be objectionable.) Indeed, a central purpose of this Article is to highlight how nonobvious these critiques of the criminal system are. Even if it were obvious (regardless of one’s normative commitments) that the state criminalizes and incarcerates too much, that would tell us that there is
a serious problem with the criminal system. But it would tell us very little about how to solve
that problem because we still would lack a baseline against which to compare results, making it
difficult to judge success and failure or to determine what solutions were desirable and which
might be off the table.
177. See, e.g., Silverglate, supra note 4; Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in
Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 23, 34 (1997); Jordan Blair
Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 672,
736 (2015).
178. See generally Silverglate, supra note 4; Kadish, supra note 43.
179. Were the critique so totalizing, it would cease to be an over critique as there would
be no baseline or optimal/acceptable rate of criminalization.
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abortion) or those that appear to go too far in empowering law enforcement. 180
A range of conservative and right libertarian critics shares some common ground with the left civil libertarian (e.g., fear of an oppressive state,
concern about arbitrary enforcement, underlying faith or belief in constitutional constraints and a nonauthoritarian criminal justice system). 181 But,
unlike the civil libertarian critic, the libertarian critic views overcriminalization alongside the administrative state and aspects of the welfare state as a
marker of unacceptable “big government.”182 The libertarian critique, then,
often takes on a fundamentally deregulatory tone—there is too much criminal regulation, but there is also too much civil regulation. 183 As a result, the
libertarian critique tends to emphasize regulatory crimes, particularly financial and environmental crimes that may harm industry. 184
Some critiques from left and right (and center) prioritize concerns for
“rule of law” and legitimacy. 185 Part of this critique rests on concerns of selective enforcement and prosecutorial discretion—as William Stuntz and
others have stressed, too many criminal statutes and/or criminal statutes that
are too broad grant too much discretion to prosecutors.186 If people commit

180. See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 43, at 162; Herbert L. Packer, The Aims of the Criminal
Law Revisited: A Plea for a New Look at “Substantive Due Process,” 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 490, 493
(1971).
181. See generally Go Directly to Jail: The Criminalization of Almost Everything (Gene Healy ed., 2004).
182. See Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of Criminal Justice, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 883, 919 (2013) (“An important strand of
contemporary conservative thought indeed sees the modern criminal justice system as big government with its usual defects.”).
183. See Grover Norquist, Opinion, Conservatives Must Police Bottom Line on Criminal
Justice, Orange County Reg. (Feb. 18, 2011, 12:40 PM), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/
prison-288870-government-criminal.html [https://perma.cc/T5K6-K6F9] (“Today’s criminal
justice system is big government on steroids, and the responsibility for taming its excesses falls
to those committed to smaller government: conservatives.”).
184. See, e.g., Marc A. Levin, At the State Level, So-Called Crimes Are Here, There, Everywhere, Crim. Just., Spring 2013, at 4, 5 (“Excessive criminalization not only leads to injustice
and unfairness, it also deters and even reduces productive activity. The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation and the labyrinth of rules it has spawned impose criminal penalties for accounting errors,
and has saddled US businesses with an estimated $100 million in compliance and opportunity
costs.”); George F. Will, Opinion, Eric Garner, Criminalized to Death, Wash. Post (Dec. 10,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-will-eric-garner-criminalized-todeath/2014/12/10/9ac70090-7fd4-11e4-9f38-95a187e4c1f7_story.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
185. See, e.g., C. Jarrett Dieterle, Note, The Lacey Act: A Case Study in the Mechanics of
Overcriminalization, 102 Geo. L.J. 1279, 1281 (2014).
186. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision
Not to Prosecute, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1655, 1665 (2010) (“[S]ubstantive overcriminalization
increases not only the need for equitable discretion, but also the risk of its misuse or abuse.”); J.
Richard Broughton, Congressional Inquiry and the Federal Criminal Law, 46 U. Rich. L. Rev.
457, 477–78 (2012); Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal
Law Through a Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 1327, 1354 (2008); William J.
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crimes all the time (knowingly or unknowingly), then people are constantly
at the mercy of prosecutors, allowing for pretextual and political prosecutions. 187 Under this view, that discretion renders criminal law un-lawlike or,
at least, highly contingent. As Stuntz claims, “[c]riminal law is . . . not law at
all, but a veil that hides a system that allocates criminal punishment discretionarily.” 188 More broadly, this critique feeds into a belief that overcriminalization undermines the importance and legitimacy of the criminal system.
As Judge Gerard Lynch argues, “[b]oth in justice to those so labeled [as criminals], and to preserve the always-threatened moral capital of the criminal
law from dilution, conviction of crime must ordinarily be reserved for those
who violate deeply held and broadly agreed social norms.” 189 Indeed, this
claim is part of what makes these over critiques emblematic of an over
frame—they depend on strong claims about the existence of a baseline that
makes the criminal justice system inherently legitimate. 190
Returning to the lists of elements that Beale and Luna provide, it is
worth noting that most of these over critiques focus on examples of overcriminalization, rather than generally discussing that baseline. That in and of
itself is not remarkable—certainly, a commentator identifying a phenomenon should be able to provide specific, concrete examples. But it is fascinating how much of the scholarship and policy work on overcriminalization relies on individual statutes or individual prosecutions. Unquestionably, the
stories of individuals ensnared in the criminal system are a critical component of public fascination with crime policy and are a significant driver of
the criminal justice reform movement. 191 Whether it is the proliferation of
statutes named after crime victims, 192 the rise of the Black Lives Matter

Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment,
114 Harv. L. Rev. 842, 855 (2001); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 4 (1997).
187. See generally Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Essay, Al Capone’s Revenge: An
Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 583 (2005).
188. Stuntz, supra note 22, at 599.
189. Lynch, supra note 177, at 47.
190. See John G. Malcolm, Criminal Justice Reform at the Crossroads, 20 Tex. Rev. L. &
Pol. 249, 281 (2016) (“There are, of course, certain kinds of crimes such as murder, rape, arson, robbery, and fraud . . . that are clearly morally opprobrious. It is completely appropriate
and necessary in such cases to bring the moral force of the government in the form of a criminal prosecution in order to maintain order and respect for the rule of law.”).
191. See Mission Statement, Marshall Project, https://www.themarshallproject.org/
about#.vdaFEZxjl [https://perma.cc/68PG-HRU3] (“The Marshall Project is a nonpartisan,
nonprofit news organization that seeks to create and sustain a sense of national urgency about
the U.S. criminal justice system. . . . In all of our work we strive to educate and enlarge the audience of people who care about the state of criminal justice.”).
192. See Rachel E. Barkow, Criminal Law as Regulation, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 316,
322 (2014).
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movement, 193 or the success of the Innocence Project, 194 personal stories and
publicized cases shape public perception and help define the politics of
crime. Or, as Rachel Barkow puts it, “in criminal law, stories, not data, drive
the policy analysis.” 195 Yet, the overcriminalization literature’s foregrounding of anecdotes presents a fascinating tension: on the one hand, most commentators suggest that overcriminalization is a sweeping phenomenon; on
the other hand, they identify one-off cases that do not necessarily appear to
be representative.
A laundry list of cases and statutes recur in overcriminalization literature as illustrations of criminal law’s absurd breadth. For example, a number
of commentators cite to United States v. McNab, 196 occasionally referred to
simply as “the Honduran lobster case.” 197 In McNab, the defendant was convicted under the Lacey Act 198 and sentenced to eight years in prison for importing spiny rock lobsters in violation of a Honduran regulation (which the
government of Honduras subsequently disavowed). 199 A pair of recent Supreme Court cases also have drawn significant attention as illustrations of
overcriminalization: in Yates v. United States, 200 a fisherman was charged
with three felonies—”destroying property to prevent a federal seizure in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a); destroying the undersized fish—an alleged
‘tangible object’ under Sarbanes-Oxley—to impede an investigation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519; and making a false statement to a federal officer in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).” 201 And, in Bond v. United States, 202 a
woman was charged under a chemical weapons treaty for attempting to poison a romantic rival. 203 While neither of these cases explicitly addresses the

193. See generally Amna A. Akbar, Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J. Legal Educ. 352 (2015).
194. See Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1549, 1551.
195. Barkow, supra note 192, at 322.
196. 331 F.3d 1228, 1232, as amended (11th Cir. May 29, 2003).
197. See Mary Beth Buchanan et al., Panel: Criminal Law at the Federal Level, The Federalist Society 2013 Executive Branch Review Conference, 18 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 97, 108, 114
(2013).
198. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 3371–3372 (2012).
199. McNab, 331 F.3d at 1232; see Buchanan et al., supra note 197, at 108; Larkin, supra
note 164, at 744 n.125. For additional discussion of the case in the context of overcriminalization, see, for example, Paul J. Larkin, Jr., A Mistake of Law Defense as a Remedy for Overcriminalization, Crim. Just., Spring 2013, at 10, 12; Luna, supra note 11, at 710 & n.42; Edwin
Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 725, 777–82 (2012); and Matthew S. White, Note, Overcriminalization Based on
Foreign Law: How the Lacey Act Incorporates Foreign Law to Overcriminalize Importers and
Users of Timber Products, 12 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 381, 388 (2013).
200. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
201. Todd Haugh, The Criminalization of Compliance, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1215,
1236 (2017); see also Cynthia Godsoe, Recasting Vagueness: The Case of Teen Sex Statutes, 74
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 173, 237–39 (2017); Smith, supra note 167.
202. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
203. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085.
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overcriminalization phenomenon, both include critiques of prosecutorial
discretion and the overbreadth and overly broad application of criminal
statutes. 204
The focus on statutes’ absurd application or on criminal prohibitions
that do not pass the “laugh test” similarly are a staple in the over literature. 205
One scholar suggests that “[t]he most ‘famously innocuous federal crimes’
are the ‘Woodsy Owl’ statute, which prohibits the unauthorized use of the
character ‘Woodsy Owl,’ the name ‘Woodsy Owl,’ and the associated slogan,
‘Give a Hoot, Don’t Pollute,’ and the federal prohibition against tearing the
tag off a mattress.” 206 Another commentator provides a list of statutes that
criminalize conduct including: “transport[ing] water hyacinths, alligator
grass, or water chestnut plants[,] . . . writ[ing] a check for an amount less
than $1[, and] . . . install[ing] a toilet that uses too much water per flush.” 207
And, a Twitter feed with over fifty thousand followers, “A Crime a Day,”
posts a new federal criminal law each day, highlighting esoteric laws or applications. 208
To be clear, none of these accounts suggests that prisons are full of people who have violated the “Woodsy Owl” statute, transported garden plants
improperly, or installed high-flow toilets. Put differently, the over critique of
overcriminalization generally does not foreground systemic punishment or
enforcement. 209 That is, the potential enforcement of statutes is a problem, as
are some specific examples of particularly egregious enforcement, but the
claim generally is distinct from claims regarding overpunishment or overenforcement. 210 Instead, the focus appears to be on preserving rule of law val-

204. See Michael Pierce, The Court and Overcriminalization, 68 Stan. L. Rev. Online
50, 50–51 (2015).
205. Luna, supra note 11, at 716.
206. Mila Sohoni, The Idea of “Too Much Law,” 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1585, 1606 n.118
(2012).
207. Malcolm, supra note 190, at 279–80.
208. See A Crime a Day (@CrimeADay), Twitter, https://twitter.com/CrimeADay
[https://perma.cc/NR5R-EWP7].
209. But see Broughton, supra note 186, at 467 (“Still others fear the problem of punishment severity and mass incarceration, which are incident to the growth of federal criminal law
and the resulting increase in prosecutions, convictions (and therefore more prisoners), and
strained budgets and resources at a time of outrageous deficits and slow economic growth.”).
210. Husak’s work is an outlier in this respect, as it explicitly argues that it is overpunishment and massive prison populations that drive his critique and make overcriminalization a
moral and political crisis. See Husak, supra note 3, at 3 (“I argue that overcriminalization is
objectionable mainly because it produces too much punishment.”). In this respect, Husak’s
over account of overcriminalization is inextricably tied to his over critique of mass incarceration. While both critiques adopt an over frame (i.e., predicated on a retributivist’s views about
deserved punishment and respect for rule of law), Husak’s move to tie the two critiques makes
his account more closely aligned with what I describe as mass critiques of overcriminalization
(i.e., accounts fundamentally concerned with enforcement). See generally infra Section III.B.
Donald Dripps similarly argues that too much punishment is a part of the overcriminalization
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ues (i.e., if we all break the criminal law, how can we respect it), reducing
prosecutorial power, and perhaps preventing any chilling effects.
Many of these over critiques are designed to highlight the absurdity or
outrageousness of the criminal code’s breadth. Critically, though, there is an
implicit assumption in many of these critiques about what should and
should not be criminalized and who should and should not be subject to
criminal penalties. For example, maybe Woodsy Owl is an easy case, but
what about hunting on certain public lands or failure to comply with food
safety laws? It is fair to argue that criminal law is not the best way to address
the concerns that those statutes advance. (And, a critic adopting a mass
frame might well agree.) But that does not mean that they are easy cases. Indeed, one of the challenges for the overcriminalization literature and the bipartisan over critique in this area is the question of civil versus criminal
regulation. If a libertarian critic believed that it were wrong or absurd for the
state to regulate civilly how a slaughterhouse employee processed meat, then
the critic necessarily would believe that criminal regulations were even
worse. That is, regulation is the evil to be stopped. Overcriminalization is but
a particularly pernicious form of that evil. But what about a critic (left or
otherwise) who believes that the state can and should regulate meat processing civilly or administratively? 211 Such a critic would need to have a theory of criminalization, or at least a way of understanding the world in which
she could tease out the different strands of regulation and make sense of
what punishments (civil or criminal) matched a given misdeed. 212 The specter of state violence might be more immediate and ominous in the criminal
regulatory context, but that doesn’t mean state violence (or threat thereof) is
somehow lacking in the civil regulatory context.
Proposed solutions reflecting an over critique tend to center deregulatory concerns, rather than a focus on prison populations or widespread enforcement. For example, former Attorney General Edwin Meese has proposed four fixes that Congress can employ to address overcriminalization:
(1) consolidating most federal crimes into Title 18 of the U.S. Code;
(2) repealing or consolidating “redundant, superfluous, and unnecessary”
criminal statutes; (3) preventing administrative agencies from defining crimphenomenon, but articulates his critique even more explicitly in over terms by emphasizing
that “all agree” incarceration is appropriate in some cases. See Donald A. Dripps, Terror and
Tolerance: Criminal Justice for the New Age of Anxiety, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 9, 12 (2003)
(“Not only are many harmless or trivially harmful acts made crimes, but harmful wrongdoing
that all agree should be criminal is made punishable by draconian prison terms.” (footnote
omitted)).
211. Cf. Douglas N. Husak, Guns and Drugs: Case Studies on the Principled Limits of the
Criminal Sanction, 23 Law & Phil. 437, 445 n.28 (2004) (noting that libertarians “have the
virtue of consistency” on some questions of criminalization).
212. See generally Douglas Husak, Reservations About Overcriminalization, 14 New
Crim. L. Rev. 97 (2011). Of course, despite her ostensibly more consistent approach, the libertarian critic would need to do a similar sort of justifying in order to explain why it is wrong
for the state to regulate in many or most cases, but why the state still can use violence against
some people who commit certain crimes.
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inal offenses; and (4) imposing heightened mens rea requirements to limit or
eliminate strict liability crimes. 213 Certainly, Meese comes from a staunchly
conservative viewpoint and might disagree with a range of other over critics,
but some of his proposals have found significant backing and reflect some
version of the over critique. Therefore, it is worth considering the practical
consequences of the proposals.
First and foremost, the emphasis here (and throughout the overcriminalization literature) is on the federal system. 214 As others have noted, 215 the
focus on the federal is misplaced, given that states do most of the policing,
prosecuting, and imprisoning. 216 Certainly scholars particularly concerned
about federalism might want to address the problem of “over federalization,” 217 but it is not clear that a state’s decision to pass many of the objectionable statutes would be less troubling than the federal government’s. 218
Even aside from that concern, though, there is real reason to be skeptical
about the practical impact of Meese’s proposals.
Three of the four (excluding the agency one) speak to concerns about
notice. Notice may be a critically important component of constitutional law
and due process values, 219 but it is not clear who actually would benefit from
the calls to consolidate. That is, most people probably don’t own a bound
copy of Title 18 and probably are not knowledgeable about the law (whether
civil or criminal). Indeed, that observation drives much of the criticism of
overcriminalization and that has led to greater calls for an expanded “mis-

213. Edwin Meese III, Principles for Revising the Criminal Code, Heritage Found. (Dec.
13, 2011), https://www.heritage.org/testimony/principles-revising-the-criminal-code [https://
perma.cc/VUN7-XWGU].
214. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 159, at 231; Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal
“Code” Is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 643,
654 (2006); Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 Va. L. Rev. 879, 908
(2005); Jeff Welty, Overcriminalization in North Carolina, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 1935, 1937 (2014)
(“Virtually all the discussion of overcriminalization has focused on the federal government . . . .”).
215. See Pfaff, supra note 20, at 13.
216. See, e.g., id. at 13–14; Welty, supra note 214, at 1937 n.7.
217. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American
Criminal Law, 46 Hastings L.J. 1135 (1995); William H. Pryor Jr., Commentary, Federalism
and Sentencing Reform in the Post-Blakely/Booker Era, 8 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 515, 517
(2011).
218. That is, unless the critique is rooted distinctly in the Commerce Clause, it is not
clear why concerns associated with overcriminalization would or should be lessened if state
legislatures, rather than the federal one, were passing the laws. The same concerns about the
moral justifications and the economic costs would persist in either case.
219. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Vagueness Principles, 48 Ariz. St. L.J. 1137, 1139–
40 (2016); Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 335, 364 (2005).
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take of law” defense. 220 To the extent that a cleaner federal code might make
it easier to be on notice, I think it is fair to wonder about the distributive effects of that notice. That is, it may be that the better educated will be more
likely to stay apprised of what the criminal code has to say. Perhaps more
pointedly, notice probably would be more meaningful to a business, corporation, or wealthy individual who retained a lawyer or had a team dedicated
to compliance. My claim is not that the wealthy should be unable to comply
with the law, or even that I would not support Meese’s proposal, but rather
that the proposal appears to speak only to a narrow segment of the population—a segment of the population that looks very different from the millions
of Americans caught up in the criminal system. 221
The recommendation regarding agency authority has a similar flavor
and appears to jibe with conservative and libertarian deregulatory takes on
overcriminalization. 222 How many defendants or prosecutions would be affected remains an empirical question, but, based on available Bureau of Justice Statistics data, it seems unlikely that regulatory offenses (i.e., crimes defined by agency, rather than legislature) account for a large percentage of
prison admissions.223
Finally, mens rea reform has been both one of the most popular reform
proposals and also one of the most contentious. 224 It has been supported by
both conservative activists and criminal defense attorneys but opposed by
politicians and commentators on the left who believe that it would operate as
a shield against prosecutions for financial and environmental crime. 225 It is
possible that mens rea reform might cut more broadly than other proposals
and implicate a range of crimes and help a range of less privileged defend-

220. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Taking Mistakes Seriously, 28 BYU J. Pub. L. 71, 115 (2013);
cf. Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is
Smarter (2013) (examining the concept of political ignorance and voters’ lack of understanding of the political system).
221. By way of comparison, consider Alexandra Natapoff’s description of the “penal pyramid.” See generally Natapoff, supra note 12. According to Natapoff, the role of formal legal
rules in the criminal system reflects a stratified society: at the top of the pyramid, the wealthy
tend to live in a world that can be described by legal rules and some concept of “rule of law.”
See id. at 73. As we move down the pyramid, legal doctrine becomes increasingly less useful as
a means of predicting outcomes or explaining individuals’ interactions with the criminal system. See id.
222. See supra notes 181–184 and accompanying text.
223. See E. Ann Carson, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prisoners in 2013, at 16–17 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf [https://perma.
cc/EX73-9XR3].
224. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Making Sure “The Buck Stops Here”: Barring Executives
for Corporate Violations, 2012 U. Chi. Legal F. 91, 109; Harvey Silverglate, Remarks on Restoring the Mens Rea Requirement, 7 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 711 (2011); Sarah N. Welling, Reviving the Federal Crime of Gratuities, 55 Ariz. L. Rev. 417, 446 (2013).
225. See Alex Sarch, How to Solve the Biggest Issue Holding Up Criminal Justice Reform,
Politico (May 16, 2016, 5:25 AM), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/05/criminaljustice-reform-mens-rea-middle-ground-000120 [https://perma.cc/HTW6-YEN3].
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ants. And, even if it primarily benefited people charged with corporate
crime, it might have a broader impact on the way in which criminal statutes
were drafted, or perhaps even the general approach to criminal punishment
that has embraced strict liability.
Once again, that these proposals might benefit business or more affluent
people does not mean that they are not worthy changes. But the proposals
help illuminate the scope of the over critiques and their distance from the
mass critiques. Indeed, each of these proposals, like the critiques from which
they flow, depends on the belief that criminalization has run amok, but that
the state does need tools to prosecute and incarcerate some class of individuals—individuals who do not need to be shielded from overcriminalization’s
reach. And, as I will discuss in Part IV, opposition to mens rea reform from
the left indicates how tenuous and contingent the over critique may be: even
among criminal justice reform proponents and critics of criminal law’s
reach, the political drive to use criminal law to address social problems (e.g.,
economic inequality or environmental degradation) remains high.
B. Mass Criminalization
While the majority of the literature on overcriminalization employs the
over frame, a certain strand (or strands) of critical writing appears to address
questions of overcriminalization through a mass frame. To be clear (and unlike in the context of mass incarceration), much of the literature discussed in
this Section is not explicitly framed in terms of overcriminalization as such.
That is, the literature addresses problems and pathologies that I think it is
fair to classify as “overcriminalization,” but the authors do not necessarily
invoke seminal overcriminalization literature or frame their critiques in similar terms. Nevertheless, scholars, activists, and commentators have adopted
a set of critiques that sound in concerns about overcriminalization, but
through a very different lens—a mass lens, prioritizing a concern for social
control, the role of the state, and criminal law’s function as a tool of social
marginalization.
As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that a limited amount of
criminal law scholarship actually does use the phrase “mass criminalization.” 226 A certain amount of this literature appears to use “mass criminalization” interchangeably with a traditional, over characterization of overcriminalization, often citing to over accounts or definitions. 227 Other authors

226. A Westlaw search of all law reviews and journals conducted on August 25, 2018
yielded seventy-four articles that used the phrase.
227. See, e.g., Andrea L. Dennis, Criminal Law as Family Law, 33 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 285,
308 (2017); Brian M. Murray, A New Era for Expungement Law Reform? Recent Developments
at the State and Federal Levels, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 361, 362 n.4 (2016) (“Mass criminalization refers to the incredible expansion and enforcement of the criminal code at the state
and federal level.” (citing Silverglate, supra note 4)); Jonathan Oberman & Kendea Johnson,
Broken Windows: Restoring Social Order or Damaging and Depleting New York’s Poor Commu-
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appear to use “mass criminalization” as interchangeable with “mass incarceration.” 228
Using a more explicitly mass frame, though, other scholars use “mass
criminalization” to refer to overcriminalization as a means of social control.
For example, Jenny Roberts critiques overcriminalization through the frame
of criminal records and collateral consequences for previously incarcerated
individuals. 229 Roberts’s claim is not that the wrong people have criminal
records or that the system is failing to sort among people who are morally
culpable and those who are not. Instead, her claim is that the effects of a
criminal conviction have rendered a growing population of adults incapable
of participating in society. 230
Although mass incarceration is perhaps the most serious and pressing
problem with the criminal justice system in the United States, most criminal cases are misdemeanors and often do not result in jail or prison time.
The problem is thus better characterized as one of mass criminalization.
Mass criminalization over the past 40 years means that about one in three
people in the United States has some type of criminal record. Law enforcement agencies have made more than a quarter of a billion arrests, and the
FBI adds between 10,000 and 12,000 new names to its database each day.
The result is that “the FBI currently has 77.7 million individuals on file in
its master criminal database.” 231

In this respect, Roberts’s characterization of “mass criminalization” sounds a
great deal like Jack Chin’s characterization of mass conviction. 232 The criminal system’s impact on communities and individuals transcends incarceration and implicates a range of stages in the process—from the earliest court
involvement through collateral consequences.233

nities of Color?, 37 Cardozo L. Rev. 931, 947 (2016) (citing to Luna for the claim that we “live
in an era of mass criminalization” (citing Luna, supra note 11, at 703–12)).
228. See, e.g., Ann Cammett, Confronting Race and Collateral Consequences in Public
Housing, 39 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1123, 1136 (2016); Ann Cammett, Deadbeat Dads & Welfare
Queens: How Metaphor Shapes Poverty Law, 34 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 233, 236 (2014); Ann
Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117
Penn St. L. Rev. 349, 352–53 (2012).
229. See Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015
Wis. L. Rev. 321, 340.
230. See id.; see also Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment Law, 39 Cardozo L. Rev.
2265 (2018) (examining the exclusion of people with criminal records from formal labor markets).
231. Roberts, supra note 229, at 325–26 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Gary Fields & John
R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, Wall
Street J. (Aug. 18, 2014, 10:30 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-records-riseamericans-find-consequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402 (on file with the Michigan Law
Review)).
232. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text.
233. See also Joel Rogers, Foreword: Federalism Bound, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 281,
294 (2016) (“ ’[M]ass criminalization’ is different, and affects even more people, than the more
familiar phenomenon of ‘mass incarceration’ . . . .”).
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Another strand of mass-inflected scholarship uses “mass criminalization” to describe over-style incarceration, but with a distinct focus on race,
gender, immigration status, and sometimes sexuality. 234 This approach is
embodied perhaps most clearly in the work of critical race theorist Devon
Carbado. Carbado cites to Sara Sun Beale’s work in describing mass criminalization, 235 but the definition he offers goes beyond the traditional over
approach. He argues that mass criminalization is not only “the criminalization of relatively nonserious behavior or activities,” but also “the multiple
ways in which criminal justice actors, norms, and strategies shape welfare
state processes and policies.” 236 In this respect, he claims that mass criminalization empowers police to confront black civilians “through the diffusion of
criminal justice officials, norms, and strategies into the structure and organization of the welfare state.” 237
Carbado’s account, coupled with Roberts’s, fits alongside the mass accounts of mass incarceration that described a sprawling web of criminal regulation and situated it alongside (or as a part of) a mode of governance that
marginalizes and controls populations. This vision of “mass criminalization”
is a totalizing form of control that “incorporates punitive responses to poverty, employment rights, and even young children’s behavior.” 238
Like the over critiques, the mass critiques address the growing universe
of substantive criminal law, but they do so with an eye to enforcement and
punishment, rather than with a focus on the laws themselves. That is, where
the over critiques were often conjectural or rooted in a concern about the

234. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of
the Causes, 104 Geo. L.J. 1479, 1487 (2016) [hereinafter Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence];
Carbado, supra note 7, at 549; Angélica Cházaro, Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm,
63 UCLA L. Rev. 594, 610 (2016); Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice in an Era of Mass Deportation: Reforms from California, 20 New Crim. L. Rev. 12, 37–38 (2017); Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 245, 311 (2016); Justin Hansford, The First Amendment Freedom of Assembly as a Racial Project, 127 Yale L.J.F. 685, 700
(2018); K. Babe Howell, From Page to Practice and Back Again: Broken Windows Policing and
the Real Costs to Law-Abiding New Yorkers of Color, 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 439,
439 (2010) (“The mass criminalization of people resulting from Zero Tolerance Policing and
‘quality of life’ initiatives adopted in the mid-1990s has made it nearly impossible for a young
man of color in our city to avoid arrest or harassment . . . .”); George Lipsitz, “In an Avalanche
Every Snowflake Pleads Not Guilty”: The Collateral Consequences of Mass Incarceration and
Impediments to Women’s Fair Housing Rights, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1746, 1770 (2012); Natapoff,
supra note 110, at 1317–18; Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, The Duty of Responsible
Administration and the Problem of Police Accountability, 33 Yale J. on Reg. 165, 203–04
(2016) (describing “the mass criminalization of young minority men through aggressive minor-offense enforcement”).
235. See Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence, supra note 234, at 1487 n.20.
236. Id. at 1487.
237. Id. at 1490.
238. Heather Schoenfeld, A Research Agenda on Reform: Penal Policy and Politics Across
the States, 664 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 155, 157–58 (2016).
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theoretical or legitimacy-based costs of overcriminalization, 239 the mass critics focus on enforcement and application. 240 For Carbado and others focused
on racial marginalization, the expansion of the criminal code matters because of the ways in which urban policing enforces those statutes against
people of color. 241 For Roberts and others focused on collateral consequences
and widespread social marginalization, overcriminalization matters because
it expands the criminal system’s reach and exposes more people to the marginalization and social stigma that accompany court involvement. 242
Taking either approach, one way of understanding the mass critique of
overcriminalization is through Jonathan Simon’s concept of “governing
through crime.” 243 In Simon’s account, starting in the latter half of the twentieth century and in the years following the attacks of September 11, 2001,
the model of government regulation became to focus on problems in terms
of threats to security and use the criminal law to address them.244 This mode
of governance through criminalization takes many forms.245 For example,
Simon and others have addressed the ways in which schools (or their students) have been criminalized. 246 Problems with academic achievement,
concerns about discipline, and worries about gangs or drugs received significant attention, but only through a system that empowers law enforcement—
placing police in schools, ramping up “zero tolerance” policies, and shifting
the space of the school from a place of academic discipline to a place of pure
discipline based on the exercise of state violence. 247 Via the so-called “school
to prison pipeline,” poor children of color are effectively criminalized—
shuttled from underachieving and underfunded schools to carceral or deten-

239. See generally supra notes 209–211 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Ann Cammett, Reflections on the Challenge of Inez Moore: Family Integrity
in the Wake of Mass Incarceration, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 2579, 2580–81 (2017); Devon W.
Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police Violence?, 51 Harv. C.R.C.L. L. Rev. 159, 163 (2016).
241. See, e.g., Carbado & Rock, supra note 240, at 163; Cházaro, supra note 234, at 610.
242. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 229, at 325–26; Rogers, supra note 233, at 294.
243. See generally Simon, supra note 118.
244. See generally id. In this respect, Simon’s account draws from Foucault’s focus on the
inherent links between governance and “security” as a means of the state asserting and consolidating its power. See Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures
at the Collège De France, 1977-78 (Graham Burchell trans., 2007); cf. Levin, supra note
101, at 554 (arguing that this conception of the state or “governmentality” helps explain the
political economy of modern carceral policy).
245. See generally Simon, supra note 118.
246. See, e.g., id. at 207–32; Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice
for Juveniles, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 1447, 1496 (2009); Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal
Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 383, 386 (2013).
247. See, e.g., Henning, supra note 246, at 386; Catherine Y. Kim, Policing School Discipline, 77 Brook. L. Rev. 861, 862 (2012).
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tion facilities. 248 To put a finer point on it, this critique differs from the over
critique in that it is not concerned with whether a given law is justified or
whether students have done bad things; rather, this account is focused on
how the criminal system effectively replaces (or at least coexists with) the
educational system as a way of managing poor children.
This style of mass critique recurs elsewhere, 249 but as a final example,
consider the highly fraught realms of intimate partner violence and sexual
assault. These are not areas of criminal law that appear in the over overcriminalization literature. To the extent that the malum in se/malum prohibitum
distinction is meaningful, 250 both clearly are malum in se crimes (i.e., the
conduct is inherently culpable). In other words, we’re a long way from
Woodsy Owl. But a number of mass critiques have focused on these crimes
as areas in which some form of overcriminalization is at work.
The critiques take two forms. First, some critics argue that the criminal
system fails to protect women of color, queer people, and other socially marginalized victims, and—in its attempts to protect them—further marginalizes
and victimizes them. 251 That is, the criminal system focuses on punishment,
rather than prioritizing the needs and wants of the victim. 252 This critique
often sounds in the same language as the racialized “mass criminalization”
critiques. 253 The concern is not one of innocence (i.e., the defendant did not
commit the crime), ignorance (i.e., the defendant did not know it was a

248. See, e.g., Martha Minow, In Brown’s Wake: Legacies of America’s Educational Landmark 28 (2010); Katayoon Majd, Students of the Mass Incarceration Nation, 54
How. L.J. 343, 347 (2011); Janet E. Mosher, Lessons in Access to Justice: Racialized Youths and
Ontario’s Safe Schools, 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 807, 827–28 (2008).
249. See, e.g., Joey L. Mogul et al., Queer (In)Justice: The Criminalization of
LGBT People in the United States (2011); Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection System [An Essay], 48 S.C. L.
Rev. 577, 584 (1997); Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 Harv. J.L. &
Gender 113, 132 (2011); Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization
of Low-Income Women, 3 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 297, 300 (2013); Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal
Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 1005, 1020–27 (2001).
250. See Benjamin Levin, American Gangsters: RICO, Criminal Syndicates, and Conspiracy Law as Market Control, 48 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 105, 154–57 (2013) (critiquing the distinction).
251. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 81; Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241
(1991); Jesse Krohn & Jamie Gullen, Mothers in the Margins: Addressing the Consequences of
Criminal Records for Young Mothers of Color, 46 U. Balt. L. Rev. 237, 241 (2017).
252. See, e.g., Jeannie Suk, At Home in the Law: How the Domestic Violence
Revolution Is Transforming Privacy (2009); Crenshaw, supra note 81; Francine T.
Sherman & Annie Balck, The Nat’l Crittenton Found. & Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr.,
Gender Injustice: System-Level Juvenile Justice Reform for Girls (2015), http://
nationalcrittenton.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Gender_Injustice_Report.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/VR4K-2QXB].
253. See generally Crenshaw, supra note 81.
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crime), or culpability (i.e., the defendant committed the crime but is not
morally culpable). Instead, the concern is that marginalized communities being criminalized—whether victims or alleged abusers—are being subjected
to intrusive policing and state intrusion. 254
A related strand of criticism focuses on “governance feminism” or “carceral feminism.” 255 Janet Halley describes “governance feminism” as a mode
of governance in which feminists have assumed the reins of power (or at
least access the halls of power) and have used this power to pursue feminist
ends. 256 According to Halley and her coauthors, governance feminist law reform projects often invoke state violence via the criminal law and:
[S]ound like fairly simple social-control projects. Method: define a wrong
happening to women; then either criminalize it with the goal of eliminating
it, or decriminalize women’s participation in the underlying exchange with
the goal of liberating them in it. The highly contingent and complex relationship between law in the books and law in action—and the multitudinous ways in which the legal system can be designed to shape but cannot
control this relationship—seem to fall outside the scope of feminist concern. 257

Through this critical lens, criminalization projects—even if well intentioned—cannot escape the flawed politics and structures of the state and the

254. The case of Bresha Meadows has attracted significant criticism from activists focused on domestic violence who are skeptical or critical of the criminal system as the ideal
mechanism for addressing these problems. See generally Jonah Engel Bromwich, Bresha Meadows, Ohio Teenager Who Fatally Shot Her Father, Accepts Plea Deal, N.Y. Times (May 23,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/us/bresha-meadows-father-killing.html (on file
with the Michigan Law Review); #FreeBresha, https://freebresha.wordpress.com/ [https://
perma.cc/ZV5S-N37W]. Meadows, a fourteen-year-old black girl who allegedly sustained significant, ongoing abuse from her father, ultimately killed him. See Bromwich, supra. Activists
rallied around her and pointed to her case as one that demonstrated the criminal system’s failures and failures to serve the interests of black girls and women. See generally #FreeBresha,
supra.
255. See, e.g., Janet Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break
from Feminism 20–22 (2006); Aziza Ahmed, When Men Are Harmed: Feminism, Queer Theory, and Torture at Abu Ghraib, 11 UCLA J. Islamic & Near E.L. 1, 5 (2012) (describing carceral feminism as “a move towards market-based (neoliberal) and punitive rather than redistributive solutions to ‘contemporary social problems’ ” (citing Elizabeth Bernstein, Militarized
Humanitarianism Meets Carceral Feminism: The Politics of Sex Rights, and Freedom in Contemporary Antitrafficking Campaigns, 36 Signs 47 (2010))); Gruber, supra note 117, at 604;
Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape,
Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 Harv. J.L. & Gender 335, 340 (2006); Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116
Yale L.J. 2, 70 (2006).
256. See Halley et al., supra note 255, at 340–41.
257. Id. at 420. But cf. Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Exit Myth: Family Law, Gender Roles, and
Changing Attitudes Toward Female Victims of Domestic Violence, 20 Mich. J. Gender & L. 1
(2013) (complicating the history of criminal law responses to domestic violence).
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criminal system. Goals of equality or redistribution are easily “subsum[ed] . . . into the state’s goal of managing undesirables.” 258
All these critiques reflect the mass frame’s general preoccupation with
criminal law as a mode of governance. Because “criminal law historically enforced and entrenched racial, gender, and socio-economic hierarchies,” 259
the turn to criminal law as a regulatory regime or as a means of solving social
problems carries with it those hierarchies and forms of structural oppression. And, the critiques of gender-based and sexualized violence demonstrate that —unlike the over critique—mass concerns apply even when the
social problems or the criminalized conduct are themselves violent or oppressive. Whether the operative description is “governing through crime,”
“neoliberal penality,” “carceral feminism,” or “mass criminalization,” the
core concerns relate to deep-seated structural and political flaws that have
allowed for punitive responses to crowd out redistributive ones.
In his over account of overcriminalization, Douglas Husak asserts that “a
comprehensive theory of criminalization requires nothing less than a theory
of the state.” 260 While the mass critiques do not necessarily offer a positive
theory of the state, their descriptive project appears to center more on a critique or critical account of the state than simply on the profusion of objectionable criminal laws.
IV. The Stakes of the Distinction
The previous Parts have shown the ways in which the two different
modes of critique play out and how they shed different light on generally accepted criminal justice system flaws. But why does the distinction matter?
The frames are not simply different languages for describing the same problem. They are different ways of understanding what is wrong that identify
flaws of different magnitudes and at different levels in the legal and political
system. Therefore, adopting one frame, accepting a critique through one
frame, or using one frame to reach policy solutions might mean alternate
outcomes and approaches.
As a result, understanding the ways that the two critiques differ is, in
and of itself, important to understanding the literature and policy debates
swirling in the contemporary moment of criminal justice reform. Appreciating the limits or tenuous nature of the critical consensus should be a key
component of conversations about how to fix the “broken” system. But this
Part aims to go a step further by identifying the ways in which the two cri-

258. Gruber, supra note 22, at 825. I have used the sexual violence examples as a case
study, but this same line of critique could apply to other instances in which progressive causes
ultimately join hands with (or are subsumed by) conservative or tough-on-crime politics.
259. Gruber, supra note 117, at 605.
260. Husak, supra note 3, at 120. Husak notes that such a theory is lacking in most accounts and, for pragmatic reasons, focuses his work on the theory of criminalization, rather
than delving into the broader theory of the state. See id.
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tiques might interact and the potential costs of a turn to the over critique to
address mass concerns or serve mass ends.
A. Over Limitations
This Article proceeds from the premise that a significant amount of
criminal law scholarship and reform work adopts the over frame. 261 For
scholars seeking to communicate with policymakers, prosecutors, and judges, the over frame probably has significant appeal. By framing the criminal
system’s problems explicitly in terms of an optimal and a suboptimal, this
approach tees up policy solutions more easily. That is, even if many scholars
adopting this frame do not articulate clearly just what the optimal rate of
criminalization or incarceration is, 262 their critiques make it easier for policymakers, judges, and prosecutors to identify or remedy problems: the 100:1
crack/powder sentencing disparity is too great and needs be reduced; 263 the
criminalization of marijuana possession is indefensible and should be abolished; 264 the resources used to prosecute and incarcerate “nonviolent offenders” are better spent on other prosecutions or other corners of the criminal
system. 265
In that respect, the over frame avoids the pragmatic concerns that the
mass frame might introduce. The optimal and suboptimal (even if framed in
more philosophical terms by retributivists, expressivists, or incapacitationists) sound in the canon of policy arguments. 266 They help make the over
frame—whatever its operative normative motivation—the recognizable
province of or discourse for the liberal reformist project.267 Even when level-

261. Cf. Capers, supra note 35, at 591 (“Certainly, much of this conversation is attributable to the numbers. We live in a country that, between 1970 and 2005, increased its prison
population by 628%, where one in every one hundred persons is behind bars, and where our
prisons and jails now hold about 2.2 million individuals.”).
262. See generally supra text accompanying notes 135–138, 173–176.
263. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 Stan. L. Rev.
1283 (1995); William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 1233, 1254–56 (1996).
264. See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, Legalize This!: The Case for Decriminalizing Drugs (2002); Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 44, at 336 (collecting sources).
265. See, e.g., Bruce L. Benson, Escalating the War on Drugs: Causes and Unintended
Consequences, 20 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 293, 351 (2009); William W. Berry III, Eighth
Amendment Presumptions: A Constitutional Framework for Curbing Mass Incarceration, 89 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 67, 96 (2015).
266. See generally Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 Hastings L.J. 1031, 1075 (2004).
267. I use “liberal” here in the sense of “liberal legalism,” rather than in the sense of “liberal Democrat.” See generally Karl Klare, Law-Making as Praxis, Telos, Summer 1979, at 123,
132 n.28 (“I mean by ‘liberal legalism’ the particular historical incarnation of legalism . . .
which characteristically serves as the institutional and philosophical foundation of the legitimacy of the legal order in capitalist societies. Its essential features are the commitment to general ‘democratically’ promulgated rules, the equal treatment of all citizens before the law, and
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ing stinging critiques at the criminal system, the over critic need not reject
the system as a whole: by decrying a “broken” system, the over approach still
retains a “good government” valence. 268 If only we could tweak the rules and
the actors’ incentive, the over critique tells us, we could start to right the ship.
There may be many major problems to address, and there may be a long way
to go in order to fix them, but the fundamental project of the U.S. criminal
system and its core tools (prisons, state violence, etc.) are not up for debate. 269 We can tackle fundamental criminal justice policies without addressing underlying structures of power (e.g., voting rights, economic inequality,
or the long hangover of segregation in jobs, housing, and schools).
Agree or disagree, that line of critique and that approach sound like the
ways a scholar might speak convincingly to a legislator considering a piece of
criminal justice reform legislation. 270 Even if the ask is a big one (e.g., reduce
sentences dramatically for a broad range of defendants; decriminalize previously criminal conduct), it is framed in manageable or recognizable terms.
The mass frame, on the other hand, sounds in a very different discourse.
Foregrounding questions of political economy, race, class, and power, the
mass frame (at least potentially) raises questions about all aspects of the
criminal system and the political economy in which it is embedded. It
sounds not in the language of small-bore solutions or narrow, pragmatic fixes, but in terms of sweeping systemic critique. Rather than telling a judge
that she should rethink some sentencing determinations or telling a legislator that she should resist the impulse to draft another criminal statute, the
mass scholar speaks a radical language of deep social ills and social injury. As
discussed above and in the next Section, this is not to say that the mass frame
does not provide or invite policy solutions—it certainly does. It is to say that
the critique itself sounds in an academic or ideological discourse that is at
best skeptical about capitalism and the fundamental structures of the criminal system. In that respect, it is no surprise that the mass frame originated
(and appears to retain significant purchase) in sociological and criminological literatures where first principles questions of political economy and dis-

the radical separation of morals, politics and personality from judicial action. Liberal legalism
also consists of a complex of social practices and institutions that complement and elaborate
on its underlying jurisprudence. With respect to its modern Anglo-American form these include adherence to precedent, separation of the legislative (prospective) and judicial (retrospective) functions, the obligation to formulate legal rules on a general basis (the notion of ration decidendi), adherence to complex procedural formalities, and the search for specialized
methods of analysis (‘legal reasoning’).”); see also Ahmed A. White, Victims’ Rights, Rule of
Law, and the Threat to Liberal Jurisprudence, 87 Ky. L.J. 357, 358 (1999).
268. See generally Klare, supra note 267 (explaining this mode of rationale legal reasoning).
269. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 266, at 1075 (“In policy argument, a major question is
whether the rule proposed will be adequately calculable . . . .”).
270. For a critical take on this approach, see generally Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 167, 178–80 (1990).
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tributive consequences are more prevalent. 271 Where the law review article as
a general matter includes a final policy proposal, 272 articles in these and other
allied fields in the humanities and social sciences need not contain such an
explicit endorsement, making this mode of critique more easily recognizable
and acceptable. Similarly, the law’s, legal academics’, and legal scholarship’s
relationship to judges, practitioners, and policymakers complicates a turn to
such a critical frame—if the lawyer-scholar’s comparative advantage comes
from her grounding in the practical aspects of the law and legal practice, 273
then does she give ground by adopting a less quantifiable or more heavily
theoretical frame? 274
All this is to say that the over turn that much contemporary legal scholarship and commentary reflects is neither surprising nor illogical. Indeed, it
makes a lot of sense, and it is an invaluable part of both the criminal justice
reform literature and movement. But I think that this turn is not costless.
That is, the pragmatism it reflects masks pragmatic concerns about its adoption. Or, put simply, different characterizations of a problem invite different
solutions. Framing mass problems as over problems means advocating for or
endorsing over solutions, not mass solutions.
By way of example, consider marijuana legalization (or, at least, decriminalization). As described above, the criminalization of marijuana possession
is a frequent target of the overcriminalization literature. 275 Similarly, over critiques of mass incarceration frequently focus on marijuana possession (and
other “nonviolent” drug crimes) as indicative of unduly harsh sentencing
policy and the existence of a prison population that does not necessarily deserve to be incarcerated. 276 Put simply, then, legalizing marijuana would be a
big win and a big step forward in addressing over critiques.

271. See generally supra Section II.A.
272. Cf. Stuntz, supra note 22, at 507 (“Consider two defining features of criminal law’s
large literature. First, it is relentlessly normative. Almost all writing about American criminal
law argues that some set of criminal liability rules is morally wrong or socially destructive, and
that a different (usually narrower) set of rules would be better.”).
273. See id.; cf. Klare, supra note 267, at 132 n.28 (“The rise and elaboration of the ideology, practices and institutions of liberal legalism have been accompanied by the growth of a specialized, professional caste of experts trained in manipulating ‘legal reasoning’ and the legal
process.”).
274. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Essay, Another Look at Professor Rodell’s Goodbye to
Law Reviews, 100 Va. L. Rev. 1483, 1484 (2014); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction
Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 35 (1992). But see
Pierre Schlag, Writing for Judges, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 419, 422 (1992) (“[T]he academic practice of writing for judges increasingly appears as a degraded art-form used to communicate
with persons who are not listening in order to achieve nothing very much whatsoever.”).
275. See, e.g., Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 44, at 336; Ekow N. Yankah, A Paradox
in Overcriminalization, 14 New Crim. L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (2011); Darryl K. Brown, Can Criminal
Law Be Controlled?, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 971, 981–82 (2010) (reviewing Husak, supra note 3).
276. See e.g., Yankah, supra note 275, at 3.
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But what about mass critiques? Presumably, many scholars and advocates who embrace mass critiques would support marijuana legalization 277—
it would be a small step toward getting the state out of the business of regulating criminally; it would eliminate a class of crimes that lead to many police stops and that are disproportionately enforced against poor people of
color; and it would reduce, in small part, the number of people exposed to
the criminal system and subjected to the universe of formal and informal
collateral consequences of conviction and arrest. Yet, the mass critique
speaks to deeper flaws than a single statute (or set of statutes) might address. 278 If the concern is with the state governing through crime, then why
should we think that police and prosecutors wouldn’t use other criminal
provisions to adopt a similar approach to regulating the underclass(es)? 279 If
the concern is with how prisons and police function, then it is not clear that
removing one crime—even an indefensible crime—from the books would
get at the real problem. Decriminalizing marijuana would be a victory in battle, not a seminal win to end the war.
Or, think back to the case of the “nonviolent” offender. 280 At this point,
it should go without saying that most of the literature on the criminal system
would support a gentler approach to such a defendant. But, from a mass perspective, a reform agenda that emphasizes the nonviolent offender has a
couple of serious problems.
First, this approach would have little to say about the majority of people
currently serving time. 281 Therefore, a reform movement, ethos, or package
of proposals based on saving the “nonviolent” individuals has serious limitations. 282 Not only would it have a low ceiling in terms of its potential for reducing prison populations, but it would also risk significant backlash. For
example, consider President Obama’s clemency grants for “nonviolent drug
offenders.” 283 In commuting a number of sentences, the Obama Administration stressed that the recipients of executive mercy were deserving in part

277. See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, Opinion, In Legalizing Marijuana, End the Racial Bias,
N.Y. Times: Room for Debate (May 22, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2013/05/22/how-can-marijuana-be-sold-safely/in-legalizing-marijuana-end-the-racial-bias (on
file with the Michigan Law Review).
278. See Forman, Locking Up Our Own, supra note 48, at 220.
279. Cf. Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, supra note 110, at 1058–61 (examining the hidden costs of decriminalization).
280. See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text.
281. See Forman, Locking Up Our Own, supra note 48, at 220; Pfaff, supra note 20, at
31–35.
282. See Gottschalk, supra note 16, at 116.
283. See Charlie Savage, Obama Commutes Sentences for 8 in Crack Cocaine Cases, N.Y.
Times (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/20/us/obama-commutingsentences-in-crack-cocaine-cases.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review); Commutations
Granted by President Barack Obama (2009-2017), U.S. Dep’t Justice, https://www.justice.gov/
pardon/obama-commutations [https://perma.cc/H9NA-M43D].
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because they had not committed “violent” crimes and, therefore, were not
dangerous. 284 When news circulated that some of the individuals to be released had been convicted of possessory gun charges, some conservative politicians and commentators grew outraged. 285 Focusing on the “nonviolent
offenders” might have seemed like the least risky move politically, 286 but the
line between violent and nonviolent is fuzzy, 287 and predicating reform on
only the “most deserving” has serious drawbacks because of the difficulty of
finding anyone (incarcerated or otherwise) who can stand up to heavy scrutiny and be found blameless.
Second, this approach serves to legitimate the system and its treatment
of “violent” offenders. As Pfaff explains, “the rhetoric and tactics used to
push through reforms for lower-level offenses often explicitly involve imposing even harsher punishments on those convicted of violent crimes.” 288 For
example, even in criticizing the criminal system and announcing plans to assist “nonviolent offenders,” President Obama explicitly stated that “violent
criminals . . . need to be in jail” and that he “tend[ed] not to have a lot of

284. The Administration sought clemency petitions and explained that they would prioritize petitions that met the following criteria:
(1) the inmate is currently serving a federal sentence in prison and has served at least 10
years of her/his sentence; (2) the inmate likely would have received a substantially lower
sentence if convicted of the same offense(s) under the guidelines in effect today; (3) the
inmate is a non-violent, low-level offender without significant ties to large scale criminal organizations, gangs or cartels and without a significant criminal history; and (4)
the inmate has demonstrated good conduct in prison and has no history of violence
prior to or during the current term of imprisonment.

Sanjay K. Chhablani, Legitimate Justice: Using Clemency to Address Mass Incarceration, 16 U.
Md. L.J. Race Religion Gender & Class 48, 51 (2016).
285. See, e.g., Heather Mac Donald, Obama Continues His Crusade Against a CriminalJustice System He Derides as Racist, Nat’l Rev. (Aug. 4, 2016, 10:16 PM), https://www.national
review.com/2016/08/obama-releases-prisoners-guilty-gun-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/G9X4-7N
6S] (“That so many of recipients of Obama’s clemency were armed and dangerous shows how
distorted the dominant narrative about ‘mass incarceration’ is.”); Bill Otis, When the Mask
Drops, Crime & Consequences (Dec. 26, 2016, 9:14 PM), http://www.crimeandconsequences
.com/crimblog/2016/12/when-the-mask-drops.html [https://perma.cc/H5PD-A9G9] (“When
pro-criminal groups thought (or fooled themselves into thinking) that they had a chance for
federal sentencing ‘reform,’ what they said they envisioned was sentencing reduction for ‘low
level, non-violent’ offenders. If you’ve read that phrase once, you’ve read it a million times.
Now that these groups understand they have no chance at such ‘reform’ for the foreseeable
future, they let us in on what the plan actually was. The stuff about ‘low level, non-violent’ offenders was a head fake.”); David Sherfinski & Stephen Dinan, Obama’s Forgiveness of Gun
Crimes amid Push for Controls ‘Incredible Hypocrisy,’ Wash. Times (Aug. 9, 2016), http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/aug/9/obamas-forgiveness-of-gun-crimes-amid-pushfor-con/ [https://perma.cc/6C2J-3YR8].
286. See Forman, Locking Up Our Own, supra note 48, at 229 (“Defenders of the nonviolent-offenders-only approach suggest that it is just a start. Reform must begin with nonviolent offenders, they say, but others might benefit later.”); cf. Pfaff, supra note 20, at 23 (describing drug sentences as “low-hanging fruit” in the quest to reform the criminal system).
287. See supra note 47.
288. Pfaff, supra note 20, at 23.
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sympathy when it comes to violent crime.” 289 One way of making “nonviolent offenders” appear more sympathetic is to provide them with a foil—
those “violent” criminals who are not in need of mercy, compassion, or at
least greater thought and consideration. This approach “effectively mark[s]
this larger group of violent offenders as permanently out-of-bounds.” 290
That is, by adopting an over frame to target the most glaring problems,
mass critics risk playing into a dynamic by which “criminal justice reform’s
first step—relief for nonviolent drug offenders—could easily become its
last.” 291 Over grants politicians political cover, but that cover comes with
risks.
By way of analogy, Carol and Jordan Steiker—staunch opponents of
capital punishment—have argued that antideath penalty advocacy strategies
that focused on methods of execution, rather than execution itself, may have
had an unintended legitimating effect. 292 While the advocacy strategy made
sense in light of Supreme Court politics and precedent, it also effectively
conceded the death penalty’s legitimacy—the arguments advanced indicated
that the death penalty itself was not unconstitutional; rather, using a given
drug or execution method made the death penalty unconstitutional. 293 Importantly, their claim is not that advocates should not have made these arguments or used the line of legal argument available to them. Instead, they
worry about the unintended consequences of such a move. 294
Ultimately, part of what makes Pfaff’s critique of the “standard story” so
important is the way in which it shows the limitations of the over frame.
That is, while Pfaff himself adopts an over frame (defining mass incarcera-

289. Forman, Locking Up Our Own, supra note 48, at 221 (first quoting President
Barack Obama, Speech to NAACP (July 14, 2015), then quoting Office of the Press Sec’y, The
White House, Press Conference by the President (July 15, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse
.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/15/press-conference-president [https://perma.cc/FW4
Q-WLT3]).
290. Id. at 230; cf. Levin, supra note 250, at 151–64 (examining the role of criminal law in
drawing lines between excusable and inexcusable wrongdoing).
291. Forman, Locking Up Our Own, supra note 48, at 230.
292. See e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 21; cf. Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990
Duke L.J. 758, 775 (making a similar claim with regard to antidiscrimination law).
293. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 21, at 404–12.
294. See id.; cf. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Converging Trajectories: Interest Convergence, Justice Kennedy, and Jeannie Suk’s “The Trajectory of Trauma,” 110 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 63
(2010) (arguing that consideration of unintended consequences should not disregard the sorts
of constraints that shape advocates’ strategies and decision making); Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion Discourse, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1193 (2010) (examining the unintended consequences of feminist advocates’ use of trauma discourse). It is
worth noting that many of the critiques that this Article describes come from academics, not
just advocates. Without veering into deeper questions of advocacy strategies (whether before
courts, legislators, or others), then, we should recognize that academics may be, and often are,
not similarly situated to movement lawyers in terms of their constraints, audiences, etc.
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tion in over terms and thinking largely quantitatively about the problem), 295
his account highlights how the over frame often has gotten it wrong. By
looking at problems in over terms—particularly by overstating the role of
nonviolent crime and the federal system—critics have arrived at critiques
that invite ill-fitting solutions. It may be that decriminalizing marijuana,
ending prosecutions of a range of low-level “nonviolent” conduct, etc. would
have significant positive results in society. But, if the claim is that such
moves will cut the prison population in half, then Pfaff shows that such approaches are off base. Much like Meese’s proposals to fix overcriminalization, 296 these solutions are solutions to one problem; it just is not clear
whether it is the same problem that the critics claim to be addressing.
B. Mass Pragmatism
To be clear, though, this Article is meant to be neither a call for ideological purity nor a critique of incrementalism. To that end, the over/mass distinction is not intended to be a stand-in (or disguise) for the incremental/
radical distinction. 297 Indeed, while the mass critique is fundamentally radical and sweeping, that does not mean that the critique is incompatible with
pragmatism or incremental reforms. 298 Existing mass critiques—both inside
and outside of the academy—often do include concrete steps or policy solutions designed to redistribute political, social, and economic power.299
Putting aside, for a moment, a range of over-style policy solutions that
would address mass concerns (e.g., drug decriminalization; ending mandatory minimum sentencing), it is important to recognize that many of the most
vital criminal justice reform efforts on the ground reflect a mass approach.300
For example, consider the movements to end cash bail and the push to reduce fines and fees in the criminal system.
In recent years, scholars and activists have focused on the problem of
cash bail: people who cannot afford bail must languish in jail as they await

295. See supra notes 119–129 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 213–225 and accompanying text.
297. But cf. Bibas, supra note 14, at 61 (describing the difference between a “radical” and
a “meliorist” approach to criminal justice reform and describing the “radical” approach as
“condemn[ing] lesser reforms as papering over injustice”).
298. Cf. Susan R. Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, Foreword, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 1687, 1688
(2006) (“Marie Gottschalk’s article takes aim at the present carceral state and analyzes the political prospects for major reform. Gottschalk is not interested in tinkering with the machinery
of the carceral state, but seeks a wholesale dismantling with the goal of reducing state and federal imprisonment rates by more than 75%. Her article offers a pragmatic assessment of the
plausible sources of such ambitious reform, including fiscal conservatives, civil rights groups,
international advocates, professional organizations (e.g. the ABA), and the judiciary.”). But see
Bibas, supra note 14, at 61 (“That radical approach is impractical.”).
299. See Akbar, supra note 59, at 20; see also Platform, Movement for Black Lives,
https://policy.m4bl.org/platform/ [https://perma.cc/9VNZ-3NUR].
300. See Akbar, supra note 59, at 7–8 (arguing for a more serious scholarly and legal engagement with radical activism by heavily policed and incarcerated communities).
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trial or resolution of their case. 301 The movement to address cash bail gained
steam following the suicide of Kalief Browder, a young man who spent three
years incarcerated at Riker’s Island awaiting trial for allegedly stealing a
backpack. 302 The over response to the problem focuses on whether the right
people are being detained (i.e., courts should use algorithms to determine if a
given defendant poses a societal danger); if so, she should remain in custody
pretrial. 303 That response addresses over concerns (i.e., more people are being detained than necessary). That said, mass responses reflecting different
concerns and priorities have attracted significant attention and backing.
Perhaps most notable has been the rise of the community bail fund—a fund
established by community members to pay bail for people awaiting trial. 304
The idea being that the court is detaining defendants in the name of the
community, but the community does not believe that the court represents its
voice(s). 305 This mass approach to the problem does not focus on optimizing
detention; rather, its goal is to resituate power and voice in the criminal system. 306 By providing bail money to defendants, community members are
able to override official decisions that might have disparate impacts or that
might not accurately reflect popular will. 307 As a part of a broader political
project of community empowerment and a less punitive criminal system, the
bail fund represents an incremental solution.

301. See, e.g., Thomas B. Harvey, Jailing the Poor, 42 Hum. Rts., no. 3, 2017, at 16; Paul
Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 Stan. L.
Rev. 711, 777 (2017); Candace McCoy, Tribute, Caleb Was Right: Pretrial Decisions Determine
Mostly Everything, 12 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 135, 141 (2007); Oberman & Johnson, supra note
227, at 933 n.8 (collecting sources); Liana M. Goff, Note, Pricing Justice: The Wasteful Enterprise of America’s Bail System, 82 Brook. L. Rev. 881, 883 (2017); Margaret Talbot, The Case
Against Cash Bail, New Yorker (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/the-case-against-cash-bail (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
302. See generally Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, New Yorker (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law (on file with the Michigan
Law Review); Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993–2015, New Yorker (June 7, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
303. See generally Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 Tex. L.
Rev. 497, 556–57 (2012) (collecting sources).
304. See generally Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 585, 593–606
(2017).
305. See id. at 633; cf. Jenny Carroll, The Jury as Democracy, 66 Ala. L. Rev. 825, 870
(2015) (“[J]ury composition should be reimagined as a forum to embrace the citizen’s fluid
identity and to promote diverse perspectives within democracy.”).
306. See Simonson, supra note 304, at 633–34.
307. Cf. Akbar, supra note 59; Eric J. Miller, Challenging Police Discretion, 58 How. L.J.
521, 545 (2015) (discussing the role of community participation in overriding police policy);
Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 391, 392 (2016) (arguing that filming police empowers otherwise marginalized communities in the criminal system); Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 2173, 2174 (2014)
(making a similar claim in the context of court observation).
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Relatedly, media coverage has helped shed light on the problem of fines
and fees in the criminal system, and a range of scholars and activists have
taken up the cause. 308 Like the cash bail issue, this is a problem deeply rooted
in issues of economic and racial justice. 309 Poor arrestees and defendants often wind up deep in debt, rearrested, or incarcerated because they are unable
to pay fines or fees that courts and police departments impose. 310 The critique of this practice is fundamentally a mass one, rather than an over one:
the issue is not that the fines should be lower, that the wrong class of defendants is being fined, or even that the fines or fees are sometimes levied against
people who have not been convicted. Rather, the concern is that the criminal
system is driving people further into poverty and helping to drive a cycle in
which people remain court-involved after their case is resolved. In some cases, the state and law enforcement entities are enriching themselves on the
backs of poor and marginalized defendants. This line of criticism and law
reform, then, explicitly confronts the place of the criminal system as a driver
of inequality and as inextricably linked to distributive justice. A growing
body of scholarship addresses these issues, and advocates are working to end
these practices via impact litigation and legislative activism. 311
While these are only two examples, they both demonstrate the capacity
of mass critiques to translate into on-the-ground legal and policy solutions.
That is, while the critique itself may be sweeping and less appealing as a way

308. See generally Alexes Harris, A Pound of Flesh: Monetary Sanctions as
Punishment for the Poor (2016); Laura I Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration:
Cash-Register Justice in the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. Rev. 1483 (2016); Neil L. Sobol,
Fighting Fines & Fees: Borrowing from Consumer Law to Combat Criminal Justice Debt Abuses,
88 U. Colo. L. Rev. 841, 844 (2017); Note, State Bans on Debtors’ Prisons and Criminal Justice Debt, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1024 (2016).
309. See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1595,
1659 (2015); Olivia C. Jerjian, The Debtors’ Prison Scheme: Yet Another Bar in the Birdcage of
Mass Incarceration of Communities of Color, 41 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 235, 257–61
(2017); Larry Schwartzol, The Role of Courts in Eliminating the Racial Impact of Criminal Justice Debt, in Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, 2017 Trends in State Courts: Fines, Fees, and
Bail Practices; Challenges and Opportunities 14 (2017), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/
Microsites/Files/Trends%202017/Eliminating-Racial-Impact-Trends-2017.ashx
[https://
perma.cc/TPA2-TSC2]; Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1723, 1724
(2015).
310. See generally Torie Atkinson, Note, A Fine Scheme: How Municipal Fines Become
Crushing Debt in the Shadow of the New Debtors’ Prisons, 51 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 189
(2016).
311. See, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017); Cain
v. City of New Orleans, 184 F. Supp. 3d 349, 352 (E.D. La. 2016) (basing Fourteenth Amendment claim on method of collecting fines and fees from defendants); Abby Shafroth & Larry
Schwartzol, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. & Criminal Justice Policy Program, Confronting Criminal Justice Debt: The Urgent Need for Comprehensive Reform (2016),
http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/Confronting-Criminal-Justice-Debt-The-Urgent-Need-forComprehensive-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG2G-WQW9]; Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the
Excessive Fines Clause, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 277 (2014); Sarah Geraghty, Keynote Remarks: How
the Criminalization of Poverty Has Become Normalized in American Culture and Why You
Should Care, 21 Mich. J. Race & L. 195 (2016).
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to frame legal or policy arguments, it is important to recognize that the mass
critique can yield mass reform movements and interventions that are pragmatic and incremental in scope. 312 It might be that these movements find
support among some critics adopting an over frame, just as it may well be
that mass critiques support over-inflected solutions. But recognizing the different motivations, priorities, frames, and goals should be an important
component of our understanding of the criminal justice reform movement
as a collection of—at times complementary, and at times contradictory—
movements.
Conclusion
In his powerful account of race and criminal justice in Washington,
D.C., Forman argues that mass incarceration is the product of “a series of
small decisions, made over time, by a disparate group of actors.” 313 Therefore, “mass incarceration will likely have to be undone in the same way.” 314 I
agree with Forman that fixing the criminal system will require many different decisions, interventions, and solutions. Indeed, as in many contexts, the
perfect may be the enemy of the good, and recognizing the promises of a
range of criminal justice reforms and reformers is and will be critical to the
movement’s success. But, in order to reform a system, we need to know what
is wrong with it, and what “reform” means. Ultimately, this Article argues
that the literature on criminal justice reform reflects two distinct ways of understanding the system and its flaws. While cooperation and compromise
will be essential to addressing the broken and unjust system, glossing over
disagreement and nuance risks losing the power of the critiques that got us
to this moment of possibility in the first place.

312. Cf. Akbar, supra note 59, at 22–30 (describing the policy “demands” adopted by the
Movement for Black Lives).
313. Forman, Locking Up Our Own, supra note 48, at 229.
314. Id.

